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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION

Defendant/Appellant Ralph Menzies relies on his opening
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.1
replies to those issues set forth below.

Appellant

Issues not addressed in

this reply brief are adequately discussed in Appellant's opening
brief.
Throughout its brief, the State urges this Court to resolve
a number of issues by holding that the issue was not properly
preserved in the trial court or was otherwise waived.
This Court has limited the concept of "waiver" of an
argument by defense counsel as it applies to capital cases.

In

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987), this Court stated:
The State responds to a number of defendant's
claims of reversible error by urging this Court
not to consider or rule on such claims because

1. The State has outlined facts in bold face in its brief which it
claims were not outlined by Appellant in his opening brief. Many of
those facts are in fact included in Appellant's opening brief. See,
e.g., State's brief at 11 ("I just want to speak to my husband");
Appellant's brief at 110 ("I just want to talk with my husband");
State's brief at 16 ("he did not expect to see the very car he had
seen at Storm Mountain"), Appellant's brief at 104 (Tim told
officers that he did not think the car would be the same car he saw
at Storm Mountain).

they were inadequately preserved at trial. We
decline to adopt that approach and instruct the
State to hereafter brief all issues on their
merits in death penalty cases.
This Court further explained that it will review all issues
raised on appeal in a capital case on their merits, and will reverse
a conviction where the errors are manifest and prejudicial.
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 553; see also State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019,
1022 (Utah 1989).
In addition, resolution of issues raised by Appellant on
grounds of waiver is not appropriate in this case, given the
inaccuracies in the transcript.2

Given the way in which the

transcript was prepared in this case and the fact that this is a
capital case in which the state is seeking to impose the death
penalty, the State's heavy reliance on waiver as a means of
resolving the substantive issues should not be embraced by this
Court.3

2. A number of different Assistant Attorneys General, including
S. Sjogren, D. Larsen, B. Bearnson, C. Soltis, C. Barlow, and
current attorney of record, J. F. Voros, Jr., have been assigned to
this case since the Notice of Appeal was filed. Defense counsel
recalls a then assigned Assistant Attorney General being asked by
this Court whether the State intended to argue waiver in this case
in light of the difficulties with the record, and State's counsel
responding that she did not believe the State would advance such an
argument in this case. Appellate counsel has been unable to locate
a tape recording of this hearing. Although current counsel for the
State was not assigned to this case at that time, and this Court has
since issued its opinion on the transcript issue, this exchange
should be kept in mind in reviewing the State's ubiquitous waiver
arguments in this case.
3. Appellant requests that this Court review all issues on their
merits. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 553. Appellant will not repeat
this discussion regarding the minimal role of "waiver" doctrine in a
capital case throughout this brief and incorporates this argument in
all sections where the State has argued that an issue should not be
reviewed because it was not properly raised in the trial court.
-

2

-

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicable standards of review are set forth in
Appellant's opening brief at 1-10.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point II.

Challenges for Cause

The responses of the jurors in the present case were
comparable to or more biased than the responses of the juror who
should have been removed for cause in State v. Young, 850 P.2d 327,
395-6, 417, 418 (Utah 1993).

The jurors were not adequately

rehabilitated and should have been removed for cause.

This Court

has repeatedly held that reversible error occurs where a defendant
is required to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who
should have been removed for cause.

This proposition was recently

unanimously reaffirmed in Young, 853 P.2d at 343, 395-6.

The State

fails to offer any compelling argument for overruling this recent
precedent.
Point III.

Discovery Violation: Post-Lineup Query

A motion to continue was not required where defense counsel
learned of the discovery violation during the course of the trial.
A continuance would not have remedied the harm caused by the
violation.

The trial court correctly concluded that a discovery

violation occurred as the result of the State's failure to provide
defense counsel with information regarding the post-lineup query
made by a key witness.
Point IV.

Discovery Violation: Inability to Select Photograph

Larabee's initial inability to select a photograph was
exculpatory evidence which the State should have conveyed to defense

-

3

-

counsel prior to trial.
Point V.

Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Britton
The confrontation clause was implicated in this case where

Britton did not appear before the trier of fact.

The trial judge

erroneously determined that Britton was unavailable and that the
former testimony was reliable.
Point XVII.

Prison File; Due Process and Confrontation Violation

The multitude of unreliable double and triple hearsay
information in the file violated Appellant's right to due process
and the eighth amendment.

The right to confrontation applies in the

penalty phase and was violated by the admission of the prison file.
In addition, admission of disciplinary reports violated Appellant's
right to due process and against self-incrimination.
Point XVIII.

Unadjudicated Conduct

The prison file contained allegations of unadjudicated
criminal conduct which the State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, in violation of due process and the eighth amendment.
Point IXX.

Discovery Violation

The State's failure to provide defendant with a copy of the
prison file requires a new penalty hearing.
Point XX.

Self-incrimination

Admission of Appellant's statements in the prison file
violated Appellant's rights against self-incrimination.
Point XXVII.

Heinousness Aqqravator

The trial judge improperly applied the heinousness
aggravating circumstance, requiring a new penalty phase.

-

4

-

Point XXIX,

Pecuniary Gain Aggravating Circumstance

The trial judge improperly applied the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance, requiring a new penalty hearing.
Point XXX.

Uncharged Aggravating Circumstance

Reliance on uncharged aggravating circumstance not argued
by the State requires a new penalty hearing.
Point XXXI.

Rap Sheets

The juvenile and adult rap sheets were unreliable and
inadmissible evidence which the trial judge relied on, in violation
of due process and the eighth amendment.
Point XXXII.

Gruesome Photographs

The trial judge erroneously admitted gruesome photographs
which had little if any relevance.
Point XXXIII.

Possibility of Parole

The trial judge improperly relied on the possibility of
parole in determining sentence.
Point XXXV.

Possibility of Escape

The trial judge improperly relied on the possibility of
escape in determining sentence.
Point XXXVI.

Improper Prosecutorial Argument

Improper penalty phase argument by the prosecutor requires
a new hearing.
Point XXXVII.

Victim Impact Evidence

Victim impact evidence was improperly considered.
Point XXXVIII.

Dr. Smith's Testimony

Dr. Smith' testimony was unreliable.

-

5

-

Point XXXXI.

Disproportionate Sentence

Imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate.
ARGUMENT
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO REMOVE JURORS FOR CAUSE.
After the opening brief was filed in the instant case, a
majority of this Court held in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 395-6,
417, 418 (Utah 1993) (Justices Durham, Zimmerman, Stewart), that
reversible error occurred as the result of the trial judge's failure
to remove a juror challenged by the defendant for cause.

The

majority determined that Juror Cole's answers indicated an inability
to sentence the defendant to anything other than death if he were
convicted of capital murder.

Furthermore, the State's attempt to

rehabilitate Juror Cole failed because (1) "it created a false
dichotomy between the juror's 'subjective' and 'intellectual'
feelings regarding the appropriate penalty," (2) "the question as
posed suggested to Cole that the State was asking what he as a juror
would do if the court had concluded that the sentence 'should not be
the death penalty,'" and (3) "'[a] statement made by a prospective
juror that he intends to be fair and impartial loses its meaning in
light of other testimony or facts that suggest a bias.'"

Id. at 396

quoting State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984), and comparing
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d

492 (1992).
A comparison of the entire voir dire of Juror Cole with the
entire voir dire of the jurors at issue in the instant case
demonstrates that the challenged jurors in the present case
evidenced similar or stronger bias than Juror Cole and were not
-
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adequately rehabilitated.4

See Addendum A to this brief containing

transcript of entire voir dire of Juror Cole in Young; Addendum C to
Appellant's opening brief containing transcript of entire voir dire
of jurors challenged in the present case.
The proper focus for this Court in assessing whether
Judge Uno erred in failing to grant a challenge for cause is whether
the voir dire of a specific juror, when viewed as a whole,
demonstrates that the "juror's views about capital punishment would
prevent or substantially impair him or her" from acting impartially
or otherwise indicate that the juror would automatically vote for
the death penalty if the defendant were convicted of first degree
murder.
Although the State argues in its brief that no error
occurred, it recognizes that Mr. Menzies' challenge to potential
jurors presents a close question.

State's brief at 125. A review

of the voir dire of the challenged jurors demonstrates that
Judge Uno committed reversible error in failing to remove them for
cause.

While Mr. Menzies relies on his opening brief at 33-8

discussing the majority of the challenged jurors, he replies
directly to the State's argument regarding Juror Cannon as follows.

4. The State's criticism that the voir dire was "muddied" by
open-ended questions about the death penalty without first outlining
the law has little impact in assessing whether the challenged jurors
should have been removed. The trial judge in the instant case used
a "script" to question jurors which was agreed to by both the State
and defendant. This "script" was used to ensure that the same
questions were asked of each juror and that all necessary questions
were covered. Many jurors survived this process without giving
answers which indicated an inability to sit as a juror in a capital
case. A trial judge's inartful questioning should not work against
the defendant. Nor does the use of leading questions require that
this Court disregard a juror's response. Jurors (and witnesses)
often respond negatively to leading questions.
-
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A.

JUROR CANNON

Like Juror Cole in Young, Juror Cannon indicated "a clear
view that if defendant was convicted of a murder that was at all
aggravated, death was the only appropriate penalty."

Young, 853

P.2d at 417. Juror Cannon stated at least five times that she would
vote for death if a defendant were convicted of murder.
352, 353, 357.

T. 350,

She explicitly stated at least twice that if the

jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, she could not vote
for life.

R. 350, 353, 357.

JUDGE UNO: If the jury should convict
Mr. Menzies of first degree murder, would you be
able to consider voting for a sentence less than
death?
JUROR CANNON:

I don't think so.

T. 353.
Defense counsel later questioned the juror on this issue,
and the juror indicated that she would impose a death sentence on
someone who had committed a first degree murder.

T. 357; colloquoy

quoted in Appellant's opening brief at 33.
Juror Cannon continued to answer that she would always vote
for death (T. 350, 353, 357), even after the judge informed her that
aggravating factors must outweigh mitigating factors (T. 352) and
asked her whether she was willing to think about mitigating
evidence.

T. 355.

These continued responses emphasize the strength

of her conviction.
As was the case with Juror Cole in Young, Juror Cannon was
not adequately rehabilitated.

The judge asked an inartful question

regarding the juror's ability to consider mitigating evidence;
before receiving an answer, he then stated,
-
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ff

[i]f this goes into a

second phase, you know, the penalty phase, the punishment phase,"
T. 355. Juror Cannon then responded, "Yes."
This exchange between the judge and juror fails to
demonstrate that the juror was willing to consider mitigating
evidence and impose life for several reasons:

(1) The judge did not

ask a question at the end of his statements; the juror may have been
responding "yes, she understood there were two phases" or "yes, she
understood that in certain circumstances the judge told the jury to
'recommend' a life sentence"; the ambiguous nature of the judge's
statements and the juror's limited response leaves a question as to
whether the juror understood the penalty phase procedure or
indicated that she would consider mitigating evidence if the
defendant were convicted; (2) as was the case in Young, the judge's
statement that consideration of mitigating evidence "would mean
recommending a life sentence" incorrectly suggests that the trial
judge might indicate his view of the proper sentence, (3) the
judge's statement that where the jury considers mitigating evidence,
"that would then mean recommending a life sentence" misstates the
law in that it suggests that in some circumstances the jury merely
recommends a life sentence rather than determines that sentence,5
(4) Juror Cannon continued to indicate she would always impose
death.

T. 357.
Given the repeated and strong response by Juror Cannon that

she would impose death where a defendant was convicted of first
degree murder, the ambiguous exchange does not clarify or establish

5. The trial judge referred to the "recommendations" of the jury
regarding sentence at other times when questioning this juror.
T. 359.
-

9

-

that she would set aside those convictions, consider mitigating
evidence and impose life.
T. 359, also cited by the state in support of its argument
that Juror Cannon was not an automatic death penalty (ADP) juror,
contains the following ambiguous exchange:
THE COURT: After weighing both of those factors,
you have a reasonable—the State has to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating
circumstances, the unfavorable factors.
Do you
understand that?
A JUROR:

No.

THE COURT: The State has the burden. They have
to show by the proof, the evidence, the
aggravating, the unfavorable factors. Do you
understand that?
A JUROR:

Yes.

THE COURT: If they failed to do so, then the
death penalty recommendation would not be made
because they didn't prove it# and you have to
consider whether they proved it or not. Do you
understand that?
A JUROR:

Yes.

THE COURT: And if they failed to prove it, then
the recommendation would be for life in prison.
A JUROR:

Yes.

THE COURT:
A JUROR:

Yes.

THE COURT:
A JUROR:

Can you consider those factors?

Would you consider those factors?

Yes.

T. 359 (emphasis added)•
This exchange also fails to rehabilitate the juror because
the judge failed to adequately or correctly state the law.

The

trial judge failed to mention mitigating evidence, instead pointing
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out that the State had the burden of proving aggravating factors.
The juror's yes response that she could "consider those factors"
refers to aggravating evidence, not mitigating factors.

In

addition, the judge continued to refer to the jury sentencing as a
"recommendation."

The juror's responses during this ambiguous

exchange fail to cleanse her earlier strong statements that she
would impose death.
The State also claims that the following exchange
demonstrates that the juror was rehabilitated.
MR. JONES: Just one other question.
Mrs. Cannon, I take it from your statements here
today you don't think the death penalty is
appropriate in every single murder case.
JUROR CANNON:

Not every single one.

R. 359.
The State acknowledges that this response "may seem
grudging."

State's brief at 37. More importantly, it fails to

address the concerns raised by Juror Cannon's dual responses that
she would impose only death where a defendant was convicted of a
first degree murder.

T. 353, 357. The prosecutor's question dealt

only with the generic term "murder."

Murder encompasses a number of

circumstances where the death penalty is not a possible sentence,
e.g. a homicide caused by a drunk driver.

The fact that

Juror Cannon would not impose death on all murderers fails to alter
her previous answers that she would consider only death for first
degree murders.
In addition, even if the prosecutor had asked only about
first degree murders and received this response, the prior bias
would not be erased given the strength and repetition of her prior
- 11
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statements despite attempts by the trial judge to clarify the role
of jurors in the penalty phase.

This response, following the

voir dire at issue, is comparable to a statement by the juror that
she "intends to be fair and impartial" and "loses its meaning in
light of other testimony or facts that suggest a bias."

See Young,

853 P.2d at 396.
Juror Cannon's response as a whole demonstrates that she
was an automatic death penalty juror.

Her responses were not

adequately rehabilitated, and Judge Uno therefore committed
reversible error in refusing to remove her for cause.
B. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURS WHERE A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT IS REQUIRED TO USE A PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE TO REMOVE A JUROR WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN
REMOVED FOR CAUSE.
This Court has repeatedly held that reversible error occurs
where a party is required to use a peremptory challenge to remove a
juror who should have been removed for cause.

State v. Gotschall,

782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah
1989); Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975);
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988); Hewitt, 689 P.2d at
25; State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v.
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d
799, 802-03 (Utah 1977); State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah
1980).
The entire Court recently reaffirmed this proposition in
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 343, 395-6 (Utah 1993).6

Young is

6. Although Justices Hall and Howe did not believe error occurred
in failing to remove Juror Cole, they acknowledged "[d]efendant
correctly asserts that prejudicial error would have occurred if he
(continued)
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recent authority from this Court which maintains the long-standing
Utah rule and holds that reversible error occurred in precisely the
same context as is claimed in the instant case.
The Utah rule is based on Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah constitution.

See,

e.g.. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987); Hewitt, 689
P.2d at 25; Bailey, 605 P.2d at 767-8.

In a criminal case, the

number of peremptory challenges is mandated by Rule 18(d), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Requiring a defendant to use one of

the peremptory challenges mandated by the rule violates a
substantial right.

See Brooks, 563 P.2d at 802; State v. Moore, 562

P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1977) (failure of trial judge to excuse juror
for cause "deprived defendant of one of his statutory peremptory
challenges").7
The State asks this Court to overrule its long-standing
rule in light of the five-year-old United States Supreme Court
decision in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101
L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).

This is not a new request by the State.

Indeed,

in its brief in Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, the State cited Ross and
asked this Court to reevaluate the reversible error rule in light of
Ross.

In response, this Court reaffirmed the well established Utah

(Footnote 6 continued)
were required to use his peremptory challenges on jurors who should
have been removed for cause." Young, 853 P.2d at 343. A majority
held that reversible error occurred. Id. at 395-6, 417, 418.
7. In a capital case, the protections of Article I, Section 10 of
the Utah constitution also come into play. As recognized by
Justice Durham in her opinion in Young, 853 P.2d at 394, Article I,
Section 10 further emphasizes or "reinforces" the right to trial by
an impartial jury in capital cases.
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rule without mentioning Ross,

Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 462.8

In response to a similar request made by the State to the
Court of Appeals in State v. Woolley, the Court of Appeals stated:
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian
after Ross was decided. We assume that the Court
considered Ross when deciding Gotschall and
Julian, but chose to stay with its long-standing
rule that "[a] court commits prejudicial error if
it forces a party to exercise a peremptory
challenge to remove a prospective juror who
should have been removed for cause.11 Gotschall,
782 P. at 461; see also Julian, 771 P.2d at 1046
n.ll. Accordingly, we assume this is still the
law in Utah.
State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 443 n.5 (Utah App. 1991).

Hence,

although this Court has not explicitly mentioned Ross in its
decisions, it appears that it has determined that Ross has no impact
on Utah law.
In Ross, the high Court determined that an Oklahoma law
which required a defendant to use his peremptory challenges to cure
erroneous denials of challenges for cause did not violate the
defendant's rights to an impartial jury and due process under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments.

Pursuant to "a long settled

principle of Oklahoma law," reversible error occurred in that state
only where a defendant used all his peremptory challenges and a
juror who should have been removed for cause actually sat on the
jury.

While the Court held that this law did not violate the sixth

and fourteenth amendments, it pointed out that it

8. This Court also denied the
certiorari in two cases, State
State v. Kavmark, 829 P.2d 860
asked this Court to reevaluate
Ross.

State's petitions for writ of
v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, and
(Utah App. 1992), in which the State
the reversible error rule in light of
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need not decide the broader question of whether,
in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the
"right" to exercise peremptory challenges, "a
denial or impairment" of the exercise of
peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant
uses one or more challenges to remove jurors who
should have been removed for cause. [citations
omitted]
Ross, 487 U.S. at 91, 108 S.Ct 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d at 92.
This "broader question" would be presented if this Court
were to consider the State's request since Utah does not have a law
similar to the Oklahoma law requiring the use of peremptory
challenges to remove jurors who should have been removed for cause.
Indeed, the well established Utah rule is that a new trial is
required where a criminal defendant is forced to used a peremptory
challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause.9
A number of jurisdictions follow the Utah rule in requiring
a new trial when a criminal defendant is forced to use a peremptory
challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause.
See cites in State's brief at 49.

In Wasko v. Frankel, 569 P.2d

230, 232 (Ariz. 1977), the Arizona Supreme Court relied on this
Court's decision in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, in
determining that the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror

9. Although a majority determined that the Oklahoma law did not
violate the right to trial by an impartial jury, four members of the
Ross Court strongly dissented. This Court is free to interpret
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah constitution differently than the
majority in Ross interpreted the federal constitution. The dissent
in Ross provides strong support for such a distinct analysis. Given
the long-standing rule in Utah, such a distinct analysis is not
necessary unless this Court were to overrule its long line of cases
following that rule. In the unlikely event that this Court were to
consider such a step, Appellant respectfully requests that it hold
that the Utah constitutional right to an impartial jury is violated
by forcing a defendant to use a peremptory challenge to remove a
juror who should have been removed for cause based on the analysis
in the dissent in Ross.
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who should have been removed for cause is reversible error.
Although the State contends that there was no "discussion or serious
analysis" in Crawford (State's brief at 45), the Arizona Supreme
Court was sufficiently impressed by the opinion to quote two
paragraphs of the language in its own opinion.

Wasko v. Frankelf

569 P.2d at 232.
Interestingly, the Arizona Supreme Court, which patterned
its rule after the Utah rule, has been faced with a Ross challenge
similar to the one raised by the State in this case.

In a thorough

and well reasoned decision, the Arizona court reaffirmed the
reversal rule in Wasko and rejected the State's request that in
light of Ross v. Oklahoma, the defendant be required to show
prejudice.

State v. Huertaf 855 P.2d 776 (Ariz. 1993).

The Huerta

court traced the history of the reversal rule in Arizona, which "is
not without some inconsistency."

Jd. at 777.

It noted that Ross

did not control its decision and focused instead on the importance
of stare decisis and the substantial rights vindicated by the rule.
The court traced the history of the peremptory challenge, pointing
out that it has

M/

very old credentials/lf and is "'one of the most

important of rights secured to the accused.'"

Id. at 779, quoting

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (overruled Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986)), and Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 89.
The Arizona court also recognized that "adoption of such a
harmless error test would inevitably lead to bizarre results" and
create a "Hobson's choice" for a defendant faced with a juror who
should be stricken for cause.

See also State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d

1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (distinguishing Oklahoma rule in Ross
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from Arizona rule) .
Various other courts have expressly rejected a Ross
challenge to the state rule requiring reversal where a peremptory
challenge is used to remove a juror who should have been removed for
cause.

See People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 244 fn.12 (Colo.

1992); State v. Wacaserf 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990) 10 ; State v.
Bennett, 382 S.E.2d 322 (W.Va. 1989).
The State has not argued that the majority of the states
with a rule similar to that of Utah, have rejected that rule in
light of Ross. 11

Indeed, courts in states with a rule similar to

that in Utah which have been presented with a Ross challenge appear
to have for the most part rejected that challenge.

See Huerta, 855

P.2d 776; Sexton, 828 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1992); Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d
190; Bennett, 382 S.E.2d 322.
As the Huerta court concluded:
Requiring a party to show separate prejudice when
a trial judge erroneously fails to remove a
biased juror would effectively eviscerate the
right to peremptory challenges []. The prejudice
of having one less peremptory challenge than the
other side is enough to mandate reversal.

10. In Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d at 193, the court recognized that
adopting the state's analysis "would severely dilute the value of
peremptory challenges" and questioned the state's claim that the
Ross rule was embraced by a majority of jurisdictions.
11. The State incorrectly relies on at least two cases for the
proposition that "[a] majority of states follow the Ross approach or
otherwise require an aggrieved party to affirmatively demonstrate
prejudice." See Commonwealth v. Susi# 477 N.E.2d 995 (Mass. 1985)
("The erroneous denial of the right to exercise a proper peremptory
challenge is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.");
State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d 222# 224 (Vt. 1992) ("reversible error
to 'force a defendant to use his last peremptory to exclude a juror
challengeable for cause' where the defendant indicates his desire to
peremptorily challenge another juror"). These two jurisdictions
actually follow a rule similar to that in Utah.
- 17

Huerta, 776 P.2d at 781.
This Court should continue to follow the longstanding Utah
rule that use of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should
have been removed for cause requires a new trial.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE
POST-LINEUP QUERY OF ITS KEY WITNESS.
A.

THIS ISSUE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW.12

The State initially argues that Appellant waived this
argument because he did not move to continue rather than asking for
a mistrial.13

State's brief at 52-3.

Contrary to the State's

argument, this Court's decision in State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1993), provides recent, strong authority that a motion for
mistrial properly preserves a discovery issue for appellate review
after a witness offers surprise testimony which has not been
conveyed to the defense.

In Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1242, this Court

reviewed on the merits a discovery violation by the State where the

12. This Court should review all issues on their merits in this
case. See "waiver" discussion supra at 1-2.
13. Although the State seems to be arguing that defendant should
have made a motion to continue rather than a motion for mistrial,
its heading in Point 3a, State's brief at 52, suggests that the
State also thinks the motion was "untimely." Defense counsel
initially moved to strike the testimony. She also asked the trial
judge "to take whatever measures are appropriate to determine that
there is not additional information that has not been provided to
us." T. 1297. She then made a motion for mistrial within ten
transcript pages of the judge's ruling striking the testimony and
admonishing the jury. T. 1299, 1304, 1313-4. The prosecutor
responded and the judge ruled on the merits. Under such
circumstances, defense counsel's motion was timely; even if the
motion for mistrial were not timely, the trial judge's ruling on the
merits preserved it for appellate review. See State v. Belqardf 830
P.2d 264 (Utah 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah
1991) (Johnson I).
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defendant made a motion for mistrial after the State had failed to
inform defense counsel that a witness would testify to incriminating
evidence that she had not previously mentioned and which had not
been conveyed to defense counsel.

In Archuleta, as in the present

case, defense counsel learned of the discovery violation by the
State as the witness testified before the jury.
While the State did not cite Archuleta on this point in its
brief, it cited other cases which it claims require that a defendant
move for a continuance in order to preserve a discovery issue.
However, those cases are distinguishable in that the defense learned
of the discovery violation before the evidence was presented to the
jury; unlike the cases relied on by the State, a motion to continue
would not have remedied the situation in this case where defense
counsel learned of the violation during the course of trial.

See

State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 882-3 (Utah 1988) (no reversal
where defense counsel learned of discovery violation prior to trial
and made no "efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused
by the prosecutor's conduct"); State v. Larson, 773 P.2d 415 (Utah
1989) (no reversal where defendant learned of discovery violation
before trial and did not move for continuance despite trial judge's
indication that he would consider such a motion); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987) (reversal where defense counsel
learned of discovery violation before trial and moved to continue).
This Court has never held that a motion to continue is
required to preserve a discovery issue for appellate review where
defense counsel learns of the violation as the evidence is presented
to the jury.

Where a continuance will not remedy the harm caused by
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the violation# such a motion is not required.

See Rule 16(g), Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure; Long v. State, 431 N.E.2d 875, 877
(Ind. App. 1982) (continuance not an effective remedy under
circumstances surrounding discovery violation); United States v.
Noe, 821 F.2d 604, 607-9 (11th Cir. 1987) (accord); Stevens v.
State, 582 P.2d 621, 624-5 (Alaska 1978) (continuance not an
effective remedy where defense counsel learned of undisclosed police
report after it had been used to defendant's detriment at trial).
Indeed, the rule envisions that the trial judge will select from
alternative remedies in order "to tailor the remedy to alleviate
harm to the defense from the failure to disclose."

See State v,

Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Mo. banc 1992) (holding that
discovery violation was reversible error in capital case).
Although defense counsel asked during cross-examination
whether Tim had indicated any hesitation in his lineup selection,
she did not know about the post-lineup discussion with the
prosecutor when she asked the question.

As she pointed out and the

judge found, she would not have asked the question had she been
aware of the information. T. 1298, 1300.
The State elicited information from Tim during redirect
examination toward the end of Tim's testimony.

While it is not

certain how defense counsel would have used this information had she
been aware of it, it is certain that she would have questioned Tim
away from the jury regarding the circumstances surrounding the
statement and his reasons for asking the question.

It is also

certain that she would have approached the critical issue of whether
Tim could identify the person at Storm Mountain in a different
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manner and not conducted her cross-examination as she did.
A continuance would not have removed the statement from the
jury's ears; nor would it have allowed defense counsel to approach
her case in a different manner.

The damage was done in this case

when Tim testified as to the statement, and a continuance would not
have mitigated the damage done by the prosecutor's violation of the
discovery rules.
B. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
STATE VIOLATED ITS DISCOVERY DUTIES.
The trial judge concluded that a discovery violation
occurred in this case.

T. 1299, 1300. A review of the record and

case law supports this conclusion.
In Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1242-3, this Court held that the
State violated its duty under Rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

In support of its holding, this Court stated:

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) imposes a
duty on the prosecutor to provide discovery
material to the defense on request. The duty is
continuous and applies whether the prosecutor is
responding to a court order or is voluntarily
producing information. Here, the State
voluntarily adopted an open file policy and
provided the defense with copies of Luce's
interviews with police. However, the State
knowingly failed to supplement information
concerning the change in Luce's testimony on the
eve of trial. Hence, as the trial court
correctly found, the State violated its duty
under rule 16(a).
Id.

Although the information in Archuleta was not exculpatory, it

fell within the State's continuing duty to disclose statements by
witnesses.
In the present case, the State did not acknowledge this
Court's decision in Archuleta or attempt to distinguish the holding
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of Archuleta that the State had violated its discovery duty under
the rule.

Instead, the State relied on Knight, 734 P.2d 913, in

support of its argument that the State did not violate Rule 16 in
this case.

See State's brief at 54.

In Knight, 734 P.2d at 917, this Court stated:
For the misleading-the-defense rationale to
apply, the discovery request must be sufficiently
specific to permit the prosecution to understand
what is sought and to justify the parallel
assumption on the part of the defense that
material not produced does not exist.
A review of the record in this case establishes that the
State's claim on appeal that the discovery request was not
sufficiently specific to cover this material is not supported by the
record.

In Appellant's motion for discovery, a copy of which is

contained in Addendum B, Appellant requested "[a]11 police reports
and investigations concerning the above-entitled case."14

The

record also reveals that the prosecutor understood this to include
statements of witnesses and responded in part to the request.
In response to Defendant's motion to strike based on the
discovery violation, the prosecutor initially claimed that "the
request for discovery has to do with evidence which is of an
exculpatory nature."

T. 1297.

Defense counsel responded:
MS. WELLS: . . . the discovery orders are for not
just exculpatory information. They are for
reports and statements of witnesses. Now, I have
received numerous statements of Mr. Larabee which
the court has seen me utilize to cross-examine.

14. Defendant also filed a "Motion to Require the State of Utah to
Disclose Potential Penalty Phase Witnesses." R. 772. In that
motion, defendant indicated that the State had already provided him
with a list of guilt/innocence phase witnesses. R. 773.
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T. 1298 (emphasis added).

The trial judge then granted the defense

motion, implicitly finding that the State had provided previous
statements by Larabee to the defense.

T. 1299.

The prosecutor interrupted the trial judge's ruling,
stating:
MR. JONES: Where—excuse me. Where in the
discovery order does it require us to—it simply
says we have to turn over the statements we
have. Just because a witness tells us
afterwards, the defense has access to these
witnesses•
T. 1299 (emphasis added).

The prosecutor's own statement indicates

that he understood the discovery motion to cover statements by
witnesses.

His claim seems to be, however, that once he had turned

over the statements, he did not have a continuing duty to inform
defense counsel "when a witness tells us afterwards."
incorrect.

This is

See Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1242-3 (holding that Rule 16

violated under similar circumstances where prosecutor failed to give
new information from witness to defense).
Both parties understood the discovery request to include
statements of witnesses.

The State supplied defense counsel with

statements from witnesses, including statements from Tim Larabee.
The trial judge implicitly found that statements from Larabee were
included in determining that a discovery violation had occurred.
Furthermore, the prosecutor had previously provided statements by
Tim to defense counsel and therefore had a continuing obligation to
inform defense counsel that this important exchange had occurred.
C.

THE DISCOVERY VIOLATION REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.

In Archuleta, this Court recognized that pursuant to
Rule 16(g), "the trial court 'has ample power to obviate any
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prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules'
and may fashion any remedy as it sees fit so long as the substantial
rights of the defendant are not violated."

Archuleta, 850 P.2d at

1243, quoting Knight, 734 P.2d at 918.
This Court articulated the following standard for reversal
where the State has violated its duty of discovery:
[A]n error based on nondisclosure by the
prosecution warrants reversal "/only if a review
of the record persuades the court that without
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant.'" A
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result
arises when the error has so eroded a reviewing
court's confidence in the outcome of a particular
trial that the court believes a new trial is
necessary. Moreover, when the state violates its
duty to disclose information, it bears the burden
on appeal of persuading the court that the error
did not unfairly prejudice the defendant.
Id. at 1243 (emphasis in the original) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
Although this Court found the discovery violation to be
harmless in Archuleta, the instant case differs from Archuleta in
that the undisclosed evidence in this case goes to the heart of the
State's case—whether or not Appellant was the man Tim Larabee saw
at Storm Mountain.

In addition to being more important to the case,

the violation was more egregious in the instant case due to the fact
that the statement was made directly to the prosecutor, he was aware
of it for over a year before trial, and it weakened the exculpatory
effect of other evidence which had been conveyed to the defense.
See Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d at 507-8 (failure to inform the defense
that it was calling a police officer was reversible error in capital
case); see also Elledge v. State, 613 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1993)
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(failure to provide defense counsel with prison reports is
reversible error in penalty phase)•
In its analysis of the reversibility issue, the State loses
sight of the fact that it has the burden of persuading this Court
that the error did not unfairly prejudice defendant.

See State's

brief at 58-9. The trial judge correctly found that a discovery
violation occurred; the State has the burden on appeal where it
violates its duty to disclose information.

Archuleta, 850 P.2d at

1243.
The State cannot sustain its burden.

It needed Tim to

directly connect Appellant to the homicide, but Larabee did not
identify Menzies in court and picked someone else out of a lineup.
This disputed piece of evidence had the impact of suggesting to the
jury that Larabee saw Menzies at Storm Mountain.

Had defense

counsel been aware of the evidence, she would have prepared her case
to preclude its admission or undermine its impact.
The trial judge recognized the importance of the evidence
and the impact that knowledge of the evidence would have had on
defense counsel's approach to the case.

T. 1300, 1301, 1302.

The confusing admonishment given by the trial judge did not
cure the error in this case.

It suggested that all of the evidence,

including the evidence that Tim selected someone else, could be
disregarded.

Although defense counsel attempted to clarify, her

statements were, of course, not instructions from the judge.

The

judge then attempted to restate the admonishment but never directly
told the jury that they were to disregard the testimony regarding a
post-lineup query.

T. 1304.
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In addition, the admonishment did nothing to change the
nature of the cross-examination conducted by defense counsel.

As

the judge recognized and as is obvious, defense counsel would have
approached her case differently had she been aware of this
information.

She had many ways to undermine Tim's query.

Full

investigation of this query would have led either to its suppression
or thorough cross-examination on the circumstances which led to
Tim's asking the question.

See generally United States v. Noe, 821

F.2d at 608 (recognizing that "trial by ambush" would be encouraged
if court decided reversibility issue based on strength of remaining
evidence).
POINT IV. NONDISCLOSURE OF THE DETAILS OF THE
PHOTO ARRAY PREJUDICED DEFENDANT.
Where defense counsel learns of the discovery violation
when the State presents the evidence to the jury, a continuance
would not mitigate the harm, and a motion for continuance is not
necessary to preserve the discovery issue for appellate review.

See

discussion supra at 18-21.
Although the State makes a halfhearted attempt to question
whether evidence that Larabee was unable to initially make a photo
selection was exculpatory, it is apparent that this evidence
undermines the impact of Tim's ultimate uncertain selection of a
photo.

See Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241, 1243 (4th Cir. 1976).

Although Tim admitted that he did not make a positive photo
selection, a selection where the person is not positive is stronger
than a selection where the person is not positive and was not able
to initially make any selection at all.
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The failure to make a

selection initially and the delay in making a selection until after
Tim went with the officer to the parking lot and looked at cars is
separate and additional exculpatory evidence which should have been
conveyed to defense counsel.
The State has the burden of persuading this Court on appeal
that Appellant was not prejudiced by this nondisclosure.
850 P.2d at 1243.

Archuleta,

Larabee's testimony regarding the man he saw at

Storm Mountain was critical to the State's case.

This information

regarding his initial inability to make a selection from the photo
array weakened Tim's ultimate selection.

Failure to disclose this

information to defense counsel prior to trial requires a new trial.
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
TESTIMONY OF WALTER BRITTON TO BE READ TO THE
JURY.
A. ADMISSION OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
TRANSCRIPT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
The essence of the confrontation right is the
opportunity to have the accusing witness in court
and subject to cross-examination, so that bias
and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of
fact.
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added).
The initial consideration in determining whether a confrontation
violation occurred is whether the witness appeared before the trier
of fact, and not whether the witness appeared in court at some
point.

See State v. Sealey 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 16 (Utah 1993);

Nelson, 75 P.2d at 1356.
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The State misapprehends the confrontation protection when
it argues that "the confrontation clause is not implicated here"
because "Walter Britton was 'physically present and subject to
cross-examination' at trial."

State's brief at 67. Walter Britton

never appeared before the jury, which was the trier of fact in this
case.

Britton appeared before the judge, who held a special

hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether
Britton was unavailable.

R. 957, 968. The jury did not have the

opportunity to review Britton or assess his bias or credibility in
this case.15

R. 957, 968. Hence, the confrontation clause is

implicated in this case.16
The State confuses the cases cited at 64-67 when it
suggests that they stand for the proposition that the witness be
present during the course of trial.

Instead, those cases require

presence before the trier of fact or a finding of unavailability.
Cases such as Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), and

15. Although the State asserts that defense counsel "chose to"
examine Britton "outside the presence of the jury" (State's brief
at 67), this assertion is not supported by the record. The
transcript pages cited by the State for this proposition are
defense counsel's cross-examination of Britton before the judge on
the availability issue. See R. 1074-81. The record reflects a
discussion about a "preliminary matter" which was to take place
outside the presence of the jury. R. 956. Britton then testified
regarding whether he would testify before the jury. R. 957. The
whole purpose of this hearing outside the presence of the jury was
for the trial judge to determine whether Britton was available and
could testify before the jury. R. 961. Defense counsel wanted
Britton to appear before the jury and argued strenuously and
repeatedly that he was not unavailable. T. 1068-9, 1090, 1091,
1094, 1105-1107, 1121.
16. The State filed its motion approximately ten days before trial
started. R. 1094. The fact that this hearing took place during
the course of the trial does not mean that the confrontation clause
was satisfied.
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Seale, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, where the witness had little memory
of events, address the issue of whether the memory loss is so
severe that the defendant is deprived of his right to cross-examine
about extrinsic statements.

See Seale, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.

They do not stand for the proposition that a witness' appearance
before the trial judge during the course of a jury trial satisfies
the confrontation clause.
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 809, involved a circumstance
where the judge conducted a "voir dire examination" of the
three-year-old witness, apparently outside the presence of the
jury, and determined that she was "not capable of communicating to
the jury."

The Court held that the confrontation clause was

violated by the admission of out-of-court statements by the witness
to an examining doctor.

Contrary to the State's suggestion that

Idaho v. Wright is "a retreat from the general rule that a
witness's physical presence satisfies the confrontation clause" and
"[a]ny exception arguably carved out by Wright would be limited to
young children" (State's brief at 64-5 fn.22), Wright is solid
confrontation clause analysis.
1.

Britton Was Not Unavailable.

Rather than addressing the unavailability issue on its
merits, the State incorrectly claims that defense counsel conceded
Britton was unavailable.

State's brief at 67 fn.24.

A review of

the entire record in this case demonstrates that no such concession
occurred.
The State bases its concession claim on the following
statement attributed to defense counsel:
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MS. WELLS: That's what I wanted the record to
state, is that as a result of his testimony
today? They are asking the court to declare him
unavailable, I assume, and to allow him to use
the preliminary hearing testimony?
Based upon my understanding of the rule, he
technically at this point would become
unavailable for purposes of the rule. However,
the question to be raised now is whether or not
the court will allow the use of his preliminary
hearing testimony.
T. 961.
This statement was made before defense counsel
cross-examined Britton on the availability issue.17
961.

T. 957-60,

The further proceedings on this issue make it abundantly clear

that defense counsel was arguing that Britton was not unavailable.
T. 1068-9, 1090-94, 1105-1107, 1121, 1125-6.

Her cross-examination

on that issue and further argument that he was available would have
been unnecessary had she conceded the issue at that point.
The day after this statement was made, defense counsel
cross-examined Britton before the judge as to whether he would
testify.

T. 1073-82.

Defense counsel then argued that Britton

should not be excused and returned to federal prison (T. 1090-91)
and that Britton was not unavailable (T. 1105-7).

Indeed, about 160

transcript pages after the statement which the State claims concedes
the availability issue, defense counsel explicitly stated that the
defense was "not conceding unavailability."

T. 1121.

The trial judge understood that the question of whether
Britton was unavailable was at issue, and ruled on that issue.

17. This may well be an example of error by the court reporter in
transcribing the proceedings. See Point I, Appellant's opening
brief.
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T. 1125.
The State's claim that it made a good faith effort to
obtain Britton's presence in the trial court during the proceedings
and was not required to make a good faith effort to procure his
testimony misreads the confrontation cause requirements.

This

Court's statement in State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah
1982), that the State must make "a good faith effort to obtain [the
witness'] presence before the trier of fact," not in an ancillary
hearing.

See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75-6 (1980);

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968).
The State has the burden of establishing unavailability; in
order to meet that burden in the context of a refusal to testify, it
must show that it made a good faith effort to present the testimony
to the trier of fact.
(Utah App. 1989).

See State v. Barelay 779 P.2d 1140, 1142

The State offers no authority for its claim that

once Britton appeared before the trial judge, the burden shifted to
Appellant (State's brief at 69), and there appears to be no
authority for this proposition since the State has the burden of
establishing unavailability.18

18. The suggestion in the State's brief at 63 fn.20 that defense
counsel refused to take the State up on its offer to assist defense
counsel in bringing Britton back takes the statements out of
context. As part of argument regarding the Rule 35 motion after the
trial judge had found Britton unavailable and sent him back over
defendant's objection, the prosecutor indicated that he knew how to
do the paperwork for bringing out-of-state witnesses to Utah, the
State was obligated to pay for such witnesses for the defense, and
he would "assist in attempting to retrieve" Britton "if for some
reason to bring him back." The prosecutor then argued that he did
not think there was any reason to bring Britton back. T. 1822.
This is a far cry from a generous offer to assist in the return of
the witness.
(continued)
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As set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 53-57, Britton
was not unavailable where he was present during the course of the
proceedings and answered specific questions despite his general
refusal to testify.

Britton did not persist in refusing to answer

questions and therefore was not unavailable.

In addition, the State

failed to establish that it made a good faith effort to procure
Britton#s testimony.
In its brief, the State does not directly address
Appellant's claims that Britton#s testimony was unreliable due to
his mental incompetency or defense counsel's inability to
cross-examine Britton at the preliminary hearing on issues such as
Britton's mental health or expectation of benefits.

See Appellant's

brief at 60-6.
The State does point out that defense counsel questioned
Britton about news reports at the preliminary hearing.

T. 2106-8.

(Footnote 18 continued)
Defense counsel then argued a number of issues, including
the trial court's previous ruling that Britton was unavailable. The
entire argument at this juncture was made in recognition of the fact
that the trial judge had already ruled that the State could use the
preliminary hearing transcript instead of Britton. In this context,
defense counsel stated:
Ms. Palacios; And we can't confront him on that
because this occurred after he testified at the
preliminary hearing. With respect to Mr. Britton
still being available, he is not. We objected,
and the court is aware we had strenuous
objections with respect to Mr. Britton being
released, and the court allowed him to be
released. So it's not as though he is still
available.
T. 1824. Britton was the State's witness; the State wanted to use
his preliminary hearing transcript. The judge had found him
unavailable and determined that the State could use that
transcript. The suggestion that under these circumstances, the
defense had some obligation to procure this out-of-state federal
prisoner in order to exercise defendant's right to confrontation
under these circumstances does not fit within notions of due process,
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However, defense counsel appears to have just learned of the news
reports as Britton testified and did not have an opportunity to
review those reports and compare them to details of Britton's
testimony.

This is important information in light of the evolution

of Britton#s statement and his initial references to incorrect
information which apparently came from news reports.

See

Appellant's opening brief at 62 fn.23.
The State responds to Appellant's argument that the
testimony of a jailhouse informant is so inherently unreliable that
it should not be presented as former testimony by citing a number of
cases for the proposition that
testimony is widely accepted."

lf

[t]he use of jail informants'
See State's brief at 68-9 fn.68.

None of these cases address the use of preliminary hearing
testimony of an informant.

See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S.

436 (1986); People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035 (Cal. 1992); State v.
Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665, 674 (Id. 1991).
Britton's testimony was so inherently unreliable that the
trial judge should not have permitted the error to be compounded by
the use of his former testimony where Appellant had no opportunity
to cross-examine Britton in front of the jury.

Because the jury did

not have the opportunity to view Britton on the stand, they were
unable to make the credibility assessment which is critical to this
type of testimony.

See Rhoades, 820 P.2d at 674 ("jury's

responsibility to weigh the credibility of [jailhouse informant's]
testimony").
POINT XVII. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE CONTENTS OF
APPELLANT'S PRISON FILE.
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A. THE LACK OF RELIABILITY OF THE CONTENTS OF
THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE, DUE
PROCESS, AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT RELIABILITY
REQUIREMENT.
While the State is correct that State v. Lipskey, 608 P.2d
1241, 1244 (Utah 1980), and State v. Sanwickf 713 P.2d 707, 709
(Utah 1986), permit the use of hearsay evidence during sentencing
for a noncapital crime, neither case involves a death sentence and
therefore the cases do not directly address the argument raised by
Appellant that the need for reliability in death cases requires that
hearsay evidence be inadmissible.

Appellant's claim is that the

sentencing phase in a capital case is distinct from sentencing
proceedings for other crimes; due process and the eighth amendment
require reliability in sentencing and preclude the admission of the
unreliable hearsay evidence contained in the prison file.
In addition, Appellant claims that the double and triple
hearsay materials in the file were so unreliable that their
admission violated federal due process.

In State v. Mills Johnson#

218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993) (Johnson II), this Court held that
a report prepared by ISAT was inadmissible during sentencing in a
noncapital case because it did "not rise to minimum standards of
reliability" which are required in a sentencing hearing.
Johnson IIf 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7.
Although hearsay evidence can be admissible in a
sentencing proceeding, double hearsay is so
inherently unreliable and presents such a high
probability for inaccuracy that it cannot stand
alone as the basis for sentencing. In State v.
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980), a
defendant's death sentence was set aside
partially because a prosecutor had been allowed
to testify in the penalty phase regarding the
substance of hearsay statements made by a witness
in another trial. Justice Wilkins observed that
"[w]hether the testimony of Watson was accurate
- 34

-

or not, it was hearsay on admissible hearsay" and
because of its lack of probative value, it should
not have been admitted in the sentencing phase,
[citation omitted]
Johnson II, Utah Adv. Rep. at 6.
In reaching its unanimous decision in Johnson II# this
Court reiterated that although "[d]ue process does not impose the
full range of trial procedure designed to sift truth from error in
sentencing proceedings [citation omitted]," it nevertheless requires
that evidence relied on for sentencing be relevant and reliable.
Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6.

This Court recognized that

"[t]he need for evidentiary reliability in sentencing proceedings is
greater when specific factual issues must be resolved."

See also

United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(recognizing although the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply in
noncapital sentencing, evidence must nevertheless meet a "threshold
requirement for admissibility"). As this Court acknowledged in
Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has held
that "as a matter of due process, factual matters
may be considered as a basis for sentence only if
they have some minimal indicum of reliability
beyond mere allegation." United States v.
Bay1in, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982).
Evidentiary reliability in sentencing is also
required by the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, which require that information used
as a basis for sentencing must have "sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy." United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659,
663 (3d Cir. 1993).
See also United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971)
(quoted by this Court in Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-7).
This Court has recognized an even greater need for
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reliability in sentencing in capital cases.

See Holland, 111 P.2d

at 1026-7, citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct.
1981, 1986, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d
944 (1976).

Hence, the concerns regarding hearsay and double

hearsay expressed in Johnson II should be even greater in this
capital case.
The prison file is replete with unreliable reports
containing double and triple hearsay.

The index to the prison file

contained in Addendum L to Appellant's opening brief lists the
various papers in that file.

While the number of unreliable reports

precludes specific discussion of each item, a few items require
particular attention.19
The Mollner report (E8:83:1-12) contains double and triple
hearsay and summary and conclusion by the investigator.

Mollner

referred to both charged and uncharged crimes, various conclusions
by third persons as to Ralph's mental state, hearsay regarding
Ralph's family background and allegations of violent threats
attributed to Ralph, and the investigator's conclusions about future
conduct by Ralph.20

19. Failure to discuss a specific item by no means suggests that
Appellant believes that particular item was admissible. Appellant
challenges the reliability and admissibility of each and every item
contained in the prison file, and submits that the need for
reliability in the penalty phase precludes wholesale admission of a
prison file made up of unreliable hearsay on hearsay reports.
20. The Mollner report should not have been admitted for a number
of reasons. For example, on page 7 of the report, under the heading
"Clubs or Organizations," the following statement appears,
"Mr. Menzies readily admits to this investigator that the
organization that he belongs to is the Salt Lake Branch of the Devil
(continued)
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The various psychological evaluations (E8:104, 105, 108,
109, 110, 143), incident reports (E8:34, 35, 36, 50, 51, 58, 59, 60,
61, 64, 69-73, 78, 79), "C" notes from unidentified sources (e.g.
E8:175, 180, 181), 1976 presentence report (E8:83:l-12) and
disciplinary hearings results all contain unreliable material.21

(Footnote 20 continued)
Worshippers and that there are two temples in the Salt Lake City
area." E8:83:7. There is no evidence that Ralph was a member of a
satanic cult. Not only is this information unreliable, its
inclusion violates Appellant's rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 1093,
117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (holding that introduction during the penalty
phase of the defendant's membership in a white supremacy group
violated the first amendment where the evidence was not relevant to
the proceedings); Dawson v. State, 608 A.2d 1201 (Del. Super. Ct.
1992) (on remand, reversing for new penalty phase). The
psychological reports at E8:108, 109, 110 are also comparable to the
ISAT report in their unreliability. The Board of Pardons
Redetermination is equally unreliable and discusses "persistant
[sic] rumors . . . that Ralph may be involved in problems on
D-Block." E8:147. The chronological notes lack any reliability;
the name of the notetaker is not even included. Those notes contain
allegations of "strongarming and drinking" (E8:169, 170), suggestion
that Ralph had used "an incidnerary [sic] device" to light a fire
(E8:172), major violation for unspecified act of violence which
could be charged as a crime (E8:173), possible "strongarm situation"
(E8:175), comments on disruptive behavior and allegation of assaults
on other inmates (E8:179), triple hearsay statement by inmate Y to
notetaker regarding allegations that Ralph used shank to
homosexually rape another inmate (E8:180), statements given to
notetaker about strike involvement or burning of cells (E8:182),
allegations of conduct threatening security of prison and threats to
officers (E8:184), discussion of major disciplinary actions
(E8:188), allegation that Ralph had two shanks (E8:192), incident
reports alleging escape (E8:195-204), assaults on other prisoners
(E8:205-6), threats to other inmates (207-8), triple hearsay report
that Ralph stabbed another inmate after being hired by other inmates
(222), disciplinary results—found guilty of stabbing inmate based
on hearsay testimony of confidential informant (223). Defense
counsel also objected to the inclusion of police reports regarding
prior crimes in the prison file. T. 3132 -3133.
21. Although the State attempts to minimize the seriousness of the
unreliable allegations contained in these various reports, a review
of the reports demonstrates that the trial judge may well have
viewed these reports as examples of criminal conduct which supported
a death sentence. In footnote 43 of the State's brief at 132, the
(continued)
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Admission of the prison file violated federal due process
and the eighth amendment requirements that a death sentence be based
on reliable information.

(Footnote 21 continued)
State suggests that the reports either "contained no implication of
wrongdoing" by Menzies or were minor incidents. The State's
characterization of the various reports underscores the need for
cross-examination and more reliable evidence.
Although Appellant has no desire to emphasize the possible
negative assessment of the reports, this Court should be aware that
the trial judge could have reviewed these reports as demonstrating
conduct which supported a death sentence. For example, the State
dismisses the double hearsay report regarding the bomb incident by
proclaiming that the incident report contains "no implication of
wrongdoing" on Menzies' part. State's brief at 132 fn.43. While,
according to the report (E8:34-5), Menzies claimed that he had found
and accidentally ignited bombs by turning on the light switch, the
judge may well have not believed that Menzies was innocent in this
scheme. This is especially true in light of the "contraband"
incident report filed two days earlier indicating that Menzies had
unauthorized light bulbs in his possession. E8:36. In addition,
the report contains double hearsay statements regarding threats
Menzies allegedly made to other inmates. E8:34. These reports
contain double and triple hearsay and, standing alone, suggest the
need for cross-examination and greater reliability in a sentencing
hearing since the judge may have viewed this report in a less
generous manner than the State, and concluded, based on double
hearsay and unreliable evidence, that Menzies was involved in a
bombing incident at the prison.
The State also attempts to minimize the incident report at
E8:50-l by referring to the conduct as "[t]he so-called criminal
conduct that defendant calls 'interfering with an officer'" and
pointing out that it merely involved "an angry expression" and
confrontative tone of voice. State's brief at 132. fn.43. While
Appellant agrees with the State that even if he had exhibited this
behavior, it is not the most serious of offense, the trial judge may
not have so believed after reading the entire incident report.
The officer who filled out the report, not defendant,
characterized the incident as "Interfering with an Officer while
trying to carry out his duty." E8:50. The officer believed that
Menzies' "actions merited an incident report" because Menzies had
refused to leave when asked to do so. Even though the officer
talked with Ralph and believed there was a "failure to communicate
on both parts," he still felt compelled to file an incident report.
The judge may have viewed this report negatively despite the State's
apparent concession on appeal that this incident did not support a
death sentence. The State's interpretation of this unreliable
evidence emphasizes the inappropriateness of allowing the judge to
(continued)
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B. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
The right to confrontation has been recognized as applying
to the penalty phase by various courts.

See Proffitt v. Wainwrightf

685 F.2d 1227, 1251 (11th Cir. 1982); Walton v. State, 481 So.2d
1197, 1200 (Fla. 1986); Moore v. Zant# 885 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th
Cir. 1989); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 488-9 (Miss. 1988);
Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987); Smith v.
State, 676 S.W.2d 379, 390-1 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984); Arnett v.
Ricketts, 665 F.Supp. 1437, 1444 (D. Ariz. 1987) (defendant's right
to confrontation violated in penalty phase).
These decisions are based on the recognition that the need
for reliability in a capital sentencing proceeding, based on due
process and the eighth amendment, coupled with the fundamental role
of the right to confrontation in assuring reliability, requires that
the right to confrontation apply in the penalty phase of a capital
trial.

See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1251.

(Footnote 21 continued)
review the unreliable reports. It also emphasizes the need for
"Lafferty findings" in this case.
The three "weapons violations" which the State attempts to
minimize (State's brief at 132 fn.43) were characterized by the
officers as incidents involving the use of a weapon on the front
pages of the three incident reports. E8:58, 60, 63. While the
State may think they are no big deal, the prison takes them
seriously, as Judge Uno may have in imposing sentence based on this
unreliable information.
In footnote 44 on page 132 of the State's brief, the State
again suggests that the prison file did not make out an incident to
be as serious as Appellant characterizes it. Although the incident
at E8:175 did involve the non-delivery of a TV and stereo, the
officer stated in the chronological note that he had told Ralph "it
appeared like a strongarm situation." Judge Uno explicitly referred
to "strongarm tactics" in sentencing Ralph to death. Hence, despite
the lack of reliable evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
Judge Uno may have relied on this unreliable report in determining
sentence.
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In contrast to the numerous decisions recognizing a right
to confrontation in the penalty phase, the State cites only one
recent case which directly addresses the issue and concludes that
the right to confrontation does not exist in the penalty phase of a
capital trial.
1986).

See Sivak v. State, 731 P.2d 1292, 209-11 (Idaho

The other cases cited by the State do not directly address

the confrontation issue.
Although the State is correct that the United States
Supreme Court has recently cited Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949) (State's brief at 136), the high Court has not cited Williams
for the proposition that the right to confrontation does not exist
in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
504 U.S.

See Foucha v. Louisiana,

, 112 S.Ct. 178, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 460 (1992) (cited in

dissenting opinion for proposition related to sentencing models);
Dawson v. Delaware, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (cited for proposition that past
cases have given sentencer the authority to consider a range of
relevant material); Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S.Ct.
2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865, 872
U.S.

(1989) (same); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501

, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2704, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 868 (1991)

(concurring opinion compares penological goals in Williams with
those in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66, 109 S.Ct.
647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989)); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365 (cited
after outlining "'three-way sharing' of sentencing responsibility11
in federal system); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710, 110 S.Ct.
3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511, 565 n.2 (1990).
Nor does Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 708, cite Williams for the
proposition that the right to confrontation does not exist during
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the penalty phase of a capital case.

Indeed, Sanwick, a noncapital

case, recognizes that even in a nondeath case, "the sentencing
process must satisfy the requirements of due process.11

Id.

The State cites several cases on pages 138-9 for the
proposition that "[p]rison records and presentence reports are
commonly recognized as reliable for sentencing.11

Other than Sivak,

731 P.2d at 209-11, these cited cases do not directly address the
confrontation issue.

See, e.g., People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d 252

(111. 1992) (acknowledging it had previously held that prison
records were "unreliable for purposes of the guilt phase of the
trial" because such records are generally prepared "with an eye
towards some form of subsequent discipline," but upholding admission
during sentencing, primarily because the victim of the most serious
recorded incident testified at the sentencing hearing); Bassette v.
Thompson, 915 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1990). 22
Admission of the prison file violated Appellant's right to
confrontation at the penalty hearing.

22. The other cases cited by the State at 138-9 either did not
involve death sentences or the records were admitted under different
circumstances for limited purposes. None of the cited cases
involved the wholesale admission for purposes of determining whether
to impose a death sentence, as occurred in the instant case. For
instance, in Walden v. United States, 306 A.2d 1075, 1076 (D.C.
1978), the trial court reviewed prison records for the limited
purpose of determining whether there was rehabilitation in deciding
a motion to reduce a 5 to 15 year sentence two years after the
sentence was imposed.
In Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1984), the court acknowledged the application of the right to
confrontation in the penalty phase of a capital trial, but held that
a certified report of the warden that the defendant had attempted to
escape had sufficient indicia of reliability to allow its
admission. In reaching its decision, however, the court recognized
that "the State may well have been skating on thin ice in utilizing
the report in place of witnesses." Smith, 676 S.W.2d at 392.
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C
THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS
REQUIRE THE EXCLUSION OF DISCIPLINARY REPORTS AT
THE PENALTY PHASE.
As outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 133-5, the due
process requirements of trial do not apply to a disciplinary hearing
in the prison.

The State must prove that a violation occurred by

only a preponderance of the evidence.

See E8:223.

This lesser

standard does not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
articulated in State v. Woodf 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), and mandated
by due process under the fourteenth amendment and Article 1,
Section 7 of the Utah constitution and the protection against cruel
and unusual punishment guaranteed by Article 1, Section 9 of the
Utah constitution and the eighth amendment.
83-4; Holland, 777 P.2d at 1026.

See Wood, 648 P.2d at

Furthermore, admission of

disciplinary reports which are not proved beyond a reasonable doubt
results in the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence which
violates due process and the eighth amendment as explained in
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).

In other words,

disciplinary events such as the stabbing of an inmate (E8:226-30)
have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.
In addition, while some forms indicate that Appellant was
given the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence,23 he did not have an attorney to help him facilitate these
procedures.

Without an attorney, such an opportunity is an empty

right in the due process context applicable during the penalty

23. It is not clear from the file that such protections were
afforded at all disciplinary proceedings. For example, the
documents relating to the disciplinary proceeding on the stabbing of
an inmate do not include information that these opportunities were
made available in those proceedings. E8:226-30; see also E8:221-5.
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phase. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77
L.Ed.158 (1932), and its progeny (recognizing importance of counsel
to fair proceeding).

Disciplinary hearings which have not been

subjected to the more rigorous protections afforded at trial result
in determinations that do not meet the reliability requirements for
a capital sentencing proceeding.

See Holland, 777 P.2d at 1026-7;

Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10-11.
Finally, forms which outline an individual's rights at a
disciplinary hearing are found throughout the prison file.

In

addition to making the statement quoted by Appellant on pages 134-5
of his opening brief and the State on page 144, the forms state:
Pursuant to the inherent protections against
being compelled to be a witness against yourself
in any criminal prosecution as provided by the
Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, we advise you that any statements
made by you during this disciplinary hearing, or
any evidence derived directly or indirectly
therefrom, may not be used affirmatively against
you in any subsequent criminal prosecution which
relates to the incident(s) for which you are
being heard before this committee today.
E8:221 (emphasis added).
An individual reading these warnings would be left with the
understanding that any statements made by him or her would not be
used in a subsequent criminal proceeding where the State was
attempting to impose a death sentence based in part on his or her
conduct in prison.

In addition, when the State introduces penalty

phase evidence, it is attempting to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that "the act" occurred and should be considered at sentencing.
This case involves a "criminal prosecution which relates to the
incidents" which were being heard since the State used those
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incidents in an attempt to obtain a death sentence.

Hence, these

forms pertain directly to the introduction at the penalty phase of
statements made by Ralph after receiving such warnings.
Statements made by Ralph at these hearings appear
throughout the file and were considered at the penalty hearing
despite the promises to the contrary.

E.g. E8:223, 227-8, 244, 251,

252, 258. Use of these statements is a further violation of the
fifth amendment, due process and the eighth amendment.

See

People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1983) (videotape made after
defendant told it would not be used in criminal proceeding properly
suppressed); Morris v. State, 436 So.2d 1381, 1386 (Miss. 1983)
(violation where state introduced statement made by defendant after
officer told defendant statement would not be used); Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 427 (1971) (promise made by
government enforced by court).
POINT XVIII. THE PRISON FILE CONTAINED
ALLEGATIONS OF UNADJUDICATED VIOLENT CRIMINAL
ACTS WHICH THE STATE DID NOT PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT, REQUIRING A NEW PENALTY PHASE.
In Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1260, n.16, this Court explicitly
required a trial judge determining sentence in a capital case to
make specific written findings as to "whether the other crime was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

This requirement applies

regardless of whether the conduct is proved; it does not limit such
findings to only the circumstance where unadjudicated conduct is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State claims that the judge did not make findings and
therefore it must be assumed that he did not rely on unadjudicated
conduct.

State's brief at 143.

This Court cannot make such an
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assumption for several reasons.

First, Lafferty tells the trial

judge to make written findings either way.24

Second, the whole

point of the findings, as explicitly discussed by this Court, is "to
assure that on review this Court can adequately assess whether
imposition of a death sentence has been improperly based on evidence
of other crimes which have not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."

Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1260 n.16.

Third, the logical

assumption, given the nature of the allegations and the prejudicial
impact of evidence of other crimes on a fact finder, is that the
judge would be affected by this unproven other acts evidence.
Finally, and most importantly, the judge explicitly stated
that he considered much of the unproven other crimes evidence.
T. 3248-75; see entire transcript of Judge's ruling in imposing
death sentence.25

Although the State claims in its brief at 144

that "[d]efendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court relied

24. There is a suggestion in the record that the trial judge
misunderstood the burden of proof necessary to establish that items
in the prison record could be relied upon in sentencing. Judge Uno
stated:
The Court; Unless it rises to the level of some
kind of criminal conduct, the prison records, if
they meet the burden of the prison standards in
regards to preponderance of the evidence, even
though there's no right to confront on some of
these matters, the Court is going to have to just
give that the weight which the Court feels it
deserves, and the objections essentially will be
overruled.
T. 3138. While the meaning of this passage is far from clear, it
raises a question as to whether the trial judge believed that
preponderance of the evidence was the proper standard for reviewing
information in the prison file. This passage lends further support
to Appellant's argument that the trial judge did not understand nor
follow Lafferty. In addition, this passage should dissuade this
Court from presuming that the trial judge only considered relevant
and competent evidence in assessing sentence.
25.

Footnote on following page.
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on improper State's evidence#" a review of Appellant's opening brief
at 135-6, 138 indicates otherwise.

For example, the judge

explicitly relied on "strong arm tactics, threats to inmates and
guards."

T. 3260.

The State did not prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that Appellant committed any of the "strong arm tactics" which
appear in the prison file.26
The State introduced the unadjudicated conduct as
aggravating evidence in an attempt to obtain a death sentence.

The

State's claim that the file was introduced not as aggravating
evidence, but only "to rebut the defense contention that defendant
could be rehabilitated" (State's brief at 143) is not supported by
the record.

The State introduced the file during its penalty phase

case in chief before Defendant offered any evidence.

T. 2884. 27

25. The judge prefaced his statements when imposing sentence by
saying ". . . 1 will go over the aggravating circumstances first,
and then the mitigating circumstances . . . ." T. 3249. After
discussing the circumstances, the judge pointed out that he had
"weighed and evaluated the mitigating circumstances and aggravating
circumstances. And the conclusion the court has reached is that
based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court
concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweighs the
mitigating circumstances." T. 3268. It is apparent that the trial
judge considered all of the factors mentioned between these two
statements. To assume that he did not contradicts that which
appears in the record.
26. Other examples of unadjudicated conduct not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt include allegations of a stabbing incident
(E8:105:2), a triple hearsay report alleging a "serious AWOL plot,"
threats with a knife and assaults (E8:104) and threats of violence
(E8:83).
27. Prosecutor Jones did argue that he was not offering the file
"as evidence of prior bad acts"; instead, he claimed that he was
offering the file "because it goes to the defendant's background, it
goes to his character, it goes to the questions of ability to
rehabilitate this man." T. 2890. The prosecutor's argument makes a
distinction without a difference. Even if the prosecutor's argument
was accepted, that argument is essentially that the bad acts in the
(continued)
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The wholesale introduction of the prison file and the trial
judge's reliance thereon requires a new penalty phase.
POINT IXX. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
APPELLANT WITH A COPY OF THE PRISON FILE REQUIRES
A NEW PENALTY HEARING.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion for discovery and the
prosecutor provided Appellant with discovery•

R- 27-8.

Appellant

also made an oral supplemental motion to discover and filed an
additional motion to require the State to disclose penalty phase
witnesses.

R. 628, 772-3.28

The State acknowledges that "[defendant's statements
reported in psychological evaluations and self-evaluations arguably
fell within the terms of defendant's rule 16 request.11

State's

brief at 148. As set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 140, the
file also contained other information which was explicitly requested.
The State was the only party with access to the file and
had an obligation under Rule 16 to provide the information conceded

(Footnote 27 continued)
file show that Appellant is a bad actor who cannot be rehabilitated;
to reach the determination sought by the State that Appellant could
not be rehabilitated, the judge first had to determine that he
committed the acts alleged in the file.
28. Although Appellant's discovery motion covered the contents of
the file, this Court should note that it is not clear in this case
that Defendant did not file a Bill of Particulars. The penalty
phase discovery motions present one of the "fuzzy11 areas created by
the irregular preparation and compilation of the record in this
case. A motion refers to a January 22, 1988 hearing on discovery.
R. 772. No such hearing has surfaced. A hearing on penalty phase
discovery was held January 25, 1988; that transcript is not
presently included in the record.
Appellate counsel recalls discussing the bill of
particulars discussion in Lafferty with defense counsel Palacios
after this Court issued its opinion in Lafferty. If this Court
believes supplementation of the record is required on this issue,
Appellant respectfully requests that this case be temporarily
remanded to the trial court for supplementation on this issue.
- 47

-

by the State and argued by Appellant.

Defense counsel reasonably

prepared her case believing that the State was calling Beverley
Tischler to introduce prior convictions in this circumstance where
the State did not provide items explicitly requested.

Because

defendant had no access to these reports and was not clearly
notified that the State intended to introduce them, this failure was
not mitigated, as claimed by the State.
In addition, the State was providing defense counsel with
discovery and defense counsel was reasonably relying on the State to
do so.

Indeed, the prosecutor indicated that he had "thousands of

conversations with defense counsel."

T. 1820-1.

defense counsel it was calling Beverly Tischler.29

The State told
Defense counsel

asked the purpose for calling Tischler, and the State responded that
"she was for the prison record."

T. 2840, 2888. As defense counsel

explained, the State uses Hinckley or Tischler to put on a
defendant's prior convictions, using the judgments included in the
prison record.

T. 2840, 2888.

The State was aware that these women

are used for that purpose and that putting on an entire prison file
was an unusual, if not unprecedented, move by the State.
Nevertheless, the State did not provide counsel with a copy of that
file, despite the existence of defendant's discovery motion which
covered the contents of the file.

T. 2888. Under such

circumstances, the State violated its discovery duties and failed to
give defense counsel adequate notice that it intended to introduce
this unusual and unanticipated evidence.

29. The State ultimately substituted June Hinckley for Tischler.
T. 2888.
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The State points out that defense counsel had one evening
and the hour and a half lunch break during the penalty phase to
review this extensive file.

T. 2899, 3128.

The file consists of

over 333 pages, some of which are filled with a number of entries.
Requiring defense counsel to use precious breaks during this long
and complicated trial to digest and respond to this extensive amount
of information put defense counsel at a serious disadvantage.
Defense counsel's review during this limited period was for
the purpose of being able to state objections on the record.
T. 2899.

Obviously, during this short period of time, much of

which was after hours, defense counsel was not able to contact the
many people to which statements in the file were attributed, prison
personnel, experts to rebut information in the file, or otherwise
make any investigation in regard to the information in the file.
This short period of time did not render the discovery error
harmless, as claimed by the State.
As discussed supra at 18-21, a motion to continue is not
required to preserve all discovery violations for review.

The

appropriate remedy for a discovery violation is that which is most
tailored to alleviate the harm.

See Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d at 507;

Elledqe, 613 So.2d at 436 (reversing death sentence where State
failed to provide defendant with prison records).

Defense counsel

objected to the file on numerous grounds; the notice objection was
included.

Defense counsel also indicated at one point that she had

not yet had an opportunity to review the file and that Mr. Menzies
was previously unaware of portions of the file because they were
confidential.

T. 3128.

She indicated further that she needed time
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to discuss the matter with Menzies and determine whether they needed
to call more witnesses.

T. 3128.

This penalty phase was already under way when defense
counsel learned of this information.

Defense counsel obtained as

much additional time as possible during the course of the penalty
phase to review this file. Under these circumstances and a due
process and eighth amendment concern for fundamental fairness, a
motion for continuance was not a prerequisite for preserving this
issue.
Finally, as set forth in Appellant's opening brief at
120-6, the due process requirement of reliability and the eighth
amendment requirement of heightened reliability in a capital case
govern this penalty phase.

The lack of notice in this case

adversely affects the reliability of this proceeding, in violation
of due process and the eighth amendment.

See Gardner v. Florida,

430 U.S. 349 (1977).
POINT XX. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED
APPELLANTS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
As set forth supra at 43-4, use of Menzies' statements in
the prison file, following warnings that such statements would not
be used, violated Appellant's right against self-incrimination.
Although the State claims that authorities did not
"interrogate" Menzies in compiling the various presentence reports
and evaluations, a review of those documents and common sense
indicates otherwise.

For example, the "Mollner report" contains

"Defendant's version" of the incident, obtained "from an interview"
between the "investigator" and defendant.

E8:83:l.

It appears that

"investigator" Mollner went through the categories in the report and
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asked defendant questions relevant to those categories.

See Health

and Future Goals sections ("Mr. Menzies related to this investigator
that his future goals are ..."

E8:83:7).

The other evaluations are also "interviews" in which the
evaluator interrogated Ralph.

See E8:105 (evaluator interviewed

Ralph on three occasions; had to prepare Ralph in order to get him
to give information); E8:108, 109, 110 (psychological assessments by
Dr. Carlisle at prison).
The interviews by various evaluators contained in the
prison file implicated the fifth amendment in the same way
Dr. Grigson's interview of the defendant implicated the fifth
amendment in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68
L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1981).
Defense counsel made a number of objections after a hurried
review of the file.
3132-4, 3135.

T. 2839-40, 2843, 2885, 2886, 2892-3, 2894,

To the extent defense counsel did not specifically

mention the right against self-incrimination, this issue should have
been obvious to the trial judge; the doctrine of plain error and the
fact that this is a capital case require that this Court review this
issue.

See generally State v. Palmer/ 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah

App. 1993) (applying plain error doctrine in noncapital cases);
Tillman# 750 P.2d at 551 (discussing concept of waiver as it applies
to capital cases).
POINT XXVII. APPLICATION OF THE HEINOUSNESS
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY
PHASE.
This issue addresses one of the aggravating circumstances
found by the trial judge.

T. 3250. A defendant need not object to
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the sufficiency of the evidence to challenge a judge's verdict on
appeal.

In addition, where the trial judge has had the opportunity

to consider the issue, the purposes of the waiver rule are not
served.

See Johnson I, 821 P.2d at 1161 (one of purposes of waiver

rules is to ensure that trial judge has first opportunity to review
the issue; "justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened"
where judge has had opportunity to review issue).
In the present case, the State argued in both opening and
rebuttal that the heinousness aggravator applied (T. 3209, 3236-7).
Defense counsel expressly took issue with the application of this
aggravating circumstance.

T. 3222.

The trial judge decided that

the aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
T. 3250.

This issue was fully presented to the trial judge and

decided by that judge and is properly before this Court.
Various courts have determined that the trier of fact
improperly applied the heinousness aggravator.

See, e.g., Booker v.

State, 851 P.2d 544, 548 (Okla. 1993) ("record does not support a
finding of mental anguish beyond that which necessarily accompanied
the underlying killing"); Crawford v. State, 840 P.2d 627, 640
(Okla. 1992) (insufficient evidence to support heinousness
aggravator where decedent killed by blunt force and manual
strangulation and no showing that decedent did not die instantly);
Lawrence v. State , 614 So.2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. 1993) (murder not
heinous, atrocious or cruel since "nothing sets this murder 'apart
from the norm of capital felonies'"); Richardson v. State, 604 So.2d
1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992) (murder not heinous, atrocious or cruel where
evidence did not establish that murder was "both conscienceless or
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pitiless and unnecessarily tortuous to the victim").
The medical examiner testified in this case that
Ms. Hunsaker died quickly from "strangulation with stab wounds to
the neck contributing to the death."

The stab wounds and

strangulation occurred close together in time.

T. 1639, 1666-7.

The State failed to establish its burden of proof under these
circumstances that torture or serious physical abuse occurred before
death.
Although this Court has conducted a harmless error review
and upheld a death sentence after an aggravating factor has fallen
out (see Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1248 (Utah 1993)), such an approach
should be used sparingly in light of the delicate calculus that
occurs during a penalty phase, and the idea that an aggravating
circumstance can act as the "thumb on the scale" and create
"randomness" and "bias" in favor of the death penalty.30

30. Utah's death penalty statute requires a jury or trial judge,
not an appellate court, to impose sentence. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-207(1), (4). This Court has only appellate jurisdiction over
capital cases. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2. Reweighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and determining whether death is the
appropriate penalty even though an aggravating circumstance has been
removed is, in essence, a resentencing. The sentencer in a capital
case should consider all mitigating evidence. Permitting an
appellate court to impose a sentence using the technique of
reweighing eliminates a crucial mechanism by which death cases can
be narrowed or channeled and by which arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty can be limited. Hence, this Court should not reweigh
when the sentencer has relied on an improper aggravating
circumstance.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that it does not
have the authority "to reweigh remaining aggravating circumstances
when it finds one or more to be invalid or improperly defined... ."
Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Miss. 1992). See also
Shell v. State, 595 So.2d 1323; Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d at
1183. In Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d at 1006, the court relied on
Mississippi's capital sentencing and death penalty appeal statutes
(continued)
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See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 326 (1992).

, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119, 119

Although this Court's decision in Archuleta

suggests that a harmless error analysis is appropriate where an
aggravating circumstance drops out, reliance on an improper
aggravating circumstance can create a greater impact than the
erroneous admission of a piece of evidence.31

(Footnote 30 continued)
and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in demons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 741, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1444, 108 L.Ed.2d
725, 733 (1990), in determining that it did not have the authority
to reweigh under state law. Tennessee has "generally held that the
case must be remanded for a new hearing on punishment" when one of a
number of aggravating circumstances has been set aside on appeal.
State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563, 570 (Tenn. 1993) (citing cases in
support of that proposition).
Although this Court conducted what it termed a "harmless
error analysis after an aggravating circumstance dropped out in
Archuleta. the Court essentially reweighed the evidence in those
cases. Any time an aggravating circumstance drops out, as opposed
to a determination that some other type of error occurred, the Court
must actually "reweigh" the remaining evidence. For instance, if
the Court were to determine that prosecutorial misconduct occurred
during penalty phase closing argument, harmless error analysis is
appropriate. However, if this Court were to determine that
Judge Uno improperly relied on an aggravating circumstance, it must
reweigh the remaining circumstances. It is Mr. Menzies' position
that any such reweighing must occur in the trial court, and he
respectfully requests that this Court reexamine the procedure
utilized in Archuleta for determining whether a new penalty phase is
required after an aggravating circumstance is removed on appeal.
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 895 (Utah 1989), may well
support Appellant's position that reweighing is improper under our
statutory scheme. In Carter, this Court held that improper reliance
on an aggravating circumstance was not harmless error and remanded
the case for a new penalty phase. This Court did not attempt to
reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Carter.
31. The State argues that reliance on an improper aggravating
circumstance is harmless because the underlying evidence could still
be considered. State's brief at 170 fn.56. Such an argument
disregards the critical requirement set forth in Wood, 648 P.2d 71,
and Holland, 777 P.2d at 1026, that the State prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances and that death is the appropriate penalty. Where an
aggravating circumstance is inappropriately considered, the
(continued)
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In Archuleta , this Court upheld the death sentence after
rejecting one of the aggravating circumstances.

In so doing, this

Court relied on the heinousness of the homicide for establishing the
harmlessness of the invalid aggravating circumstance.
Given the especially atrocious and depraved
nature of the prolonged torture and eventual
murder of Church and the relative lack of
mitigating circumstances, we can confidently say
beyond a reasonable doubt that even if the jury
had not considered the invalid aggravator, it
would have returned a verdict of death.
Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1248.
By contrast, in the instant case, the heinousness
aggravator is not applicable and significant mitigating evidence
exists; hence, the aggravating factor that this Court relied on in
Archuleta for its confidence in the death sentence is not applicable
in this case.

Archuleta supports the notion that the heinousness

aggravator is a critical circumstance in assessing sentence.

Its

erroneous application in this case was not harmless error.
Judge Uno's erroneous perception that the heinousness aggravator
applied in this case may well have been the thumb on the scale which
resulted in a death rather than life sentence.

See Carter, 776 P.2d

(Footnote 31 continued)
determination under the first prong is upset. The eighth amendment
requires that the Court then reweigh or conduct a harmless error
review. See demons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738. The State's
argument also disregards the recognition by the United States
Supreme Court in Stringer v. Black, 112 S.Ct. at 2119, that finding
an aggravating circumstance can result in the "thumb on the scale"
which results in a death sentence.
The fact that Judge Uno improperly relied on the
heinousness aggravator means that he gave undue weight to the
evidence as to the nature of the homicide. That error is not
assuaged by determining that he simply relied on the underlying
evidence.
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at 895 (reversing death sentence and remanding for new penalty phase
after heinousness aggravator removed).
POINT XXIX. APPLICATION OF THE PECUNIARY GAIN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY
HEARING.
The trial judge explicitly relied on the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance in assessing sentence.

T. 3249-50.32

The trial judge stated:
In starting with the aggravating circumstances, I
will start with the nature of the crime. One,
... . Two, under 76-5-202(7)(f), "the homicide
was committed for pecuniary or personal gain.
T. 3249-50.

The fact that the State neither argued nor charged this

aggravating circumstance does not mitigate the trial judge's
reliance on the factor.

Indeed, the trial judge's sua sponte

reliance on the factor heightens the prejudice since Defendant was
deprived of notice that this factor was at issue.

In addition, it

should have heightened the trial judge's sense that the factor did
not apply.
In Robertson v. State, 611 So.2d 1228, 1233 (Fla. 1993),
the court restated that
... it is improper to double the consideration of
the aggravating circumstances of robbery and
pecuniary gain when both circumstances referred
'to the same aspect of the defendant's crime.'
[citation omitted]. In making this
determination, the aggravating circumstances of
robbery and pecuniary gain 'may not be considered
individually when the only evidence that the
crime was committed for pecuniary gain was the
same evidence of the robbery underlying the
capital crime. [citation omitted].

32. The transcript of the sentencing is found at T. 3248-3270. A
copy of the entire transcript of the sentencing is contained in
Addendum C to this brief.
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See also Davis v. State, 604 So.2d 794, 798 (Fla. 1992) (doubling
aggravating factors of burglary and pecuniary gain "is improper
where the factors are based on the same aspect of the criminal
episode"); Castro v. State, 597 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla. 1992) (reliance
on robbery and pecuniary gain "constitutes improper doubling" of
aggravating circumstances); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171
(instructing jury that it could consider both robbery and pecuniary
gain aggravating factors was reversible error).
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (Utah 1977), this
Court did not directly address the issue raised by Appellant in this
part.

In Pierre, the defendant argued that instruction on the

robbery aggravating circumstance "overlapped" with the instruction
on pecuniary gain, and that pecuniary gain "should be limited to
circumstances of 'a hired murder./M

Id.

This Court resolved the

issue, stating:
No error exists in having two instructions
overlap in part. [footnote omitted] And nothing
inheres in the wording "pecuniary gain" which
compels the restrictive interpretation defendant
places on it.
Id . Nor did this Court directly address this issue in Young, 853
P.2d at 336-7.
Mr. Menzies' argument is that due process and the eighth
amendment are violated where the identical evidence is used to
establish two aggravating circumstances.

Any pecuniary gain in this

case was based on robbery and therefore did not fall under a
distinct circumstance.

In this case, the trial judge improperly

relied on two aggravating circumstances which were based on the same
evidence when he determined that aggravating circumstances
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outweighed mitigating circumstances.
The State again argues that any error was not prejudicial
based on its claim that "facts, not labels, are weighed in the
penalty phase."

State's brief at 175. As set forth supra at 57,

such an argument is incorrect.

In Young, 853 P.2d at 364, this

Court reiterated the two-prong test set forth in Wood.

This Court

then stated:
In State v. Holland [777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989)],
we emphasized the importance of both prongs of
the Wood test. We noted that employing the first
prong alone could produce an unduly broad
application of the death penalty and could result
in a mere numerical counting of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in each case,
[footnote omitted]. The second prong of the Wood
test serves the important function of allowing
the jurors to look at the totality of the case in
light of their societal values and personal
experiences.
The finding of aggravating circumstances is a critical step in the
penalty determination.

While the mere numerical counting of

circumstances is improper, it does not follow that the finding of
aggravating circumstances has no impact on the penalty decision.
The trial judge's reliance on this additional circumstance
may well have been the "thumb on the scale" which tipped the
balance.

In addition, the trial judge erroneously relied on more

than one aggravating circumstance in this case.

Under such

circumstances, the erroneous reliance is not harmless and
Mr. Menzies should be granted a new penalty hearing.
POINT XXX. RELIANCE ON UNCHARGED AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE.
While Appellant acknowledges this Court's holding in Young,
853 P.2d at 352, that the sentencer can consider uncharged
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aggravating circumstances in the penalty phase, for purposes of
preserving this issue for federal review, Appellant continues to
maintain that such a procedure violates federal due process and the
eighth amendment.
In addition, the decision in Young does not relate directly
to the sua sponte reliance by the trier of fact on an uncharged
aggravating circumstance which was not argued by the State.
Mr. Menzies maintains that due process and the eighth amendment are
violated where the trial judge sua sponte relies on an aggravating
circumstance without any notice to defendant that the specific
circumstance is being considered.33
POINT XXXI. ADMISSION OF ADULT AND JUVENILE RAP
SHEETS DURING THE PENALTY PHASE WAS REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
In this point, Appellant argues that the rap sheets were
inadmissible for a number of reasons, and that the State was
required to present more reliable evidence in order to establish
Mr. Menzies' criminal record.
In State v. Diazy 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah App.
1993), the Court of Appeals recently stated:
It is readily apparent that a "rap sheet," which
does not fit within any of the permissible means
of admitting evidence of a prior conviction, is
not a properly reliable method of establishing
the existence of that prior conviction.
In reaching its decision that rap sheets are not admissible,

33. Furthermore, a jury would not have had the free rein to find
any statutory aggravating circumstance and would have been limited
to the aggravating circumstances on which it was instructed.
Mr. Menzies waived his right to a jury during the penalty phase
without notice that the judge might sua sponte rely on additional
aggravating circumstances.
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reliable evidence, the Diaz court relied on this Court's decision in
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977).
In State v. Peterson,r1# the Utah Supreme Court
held that evidence of a prior conviction is only
admissible if it is shown by (1) the oral
testimony of the witness himself, (2) the court
record of such conviction, or (3) a properly
certified copy thereof- Id. at 1390 (quoting
Wright v. State, 38 Ala. 420, 79 So.2d 66, 68
(1954), cert, denied 262 Ala. 420, 79 So.2d 74
(1955)).
Diaz, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31.
Admission of such unreliable evidence violates due
process.

See Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.

In addition,

imposing a death sentence based on unreliable evidence violates the
eighth amendment.

See Young, 853 P.2d at 376 ("Because #death is

different,' the State imposes capital punishment only after
following the strictest legal and constitutional safeguards.").
Furthermore, the State has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that such crimes occurred, in violation of due
process and the eighth amendment.

See Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1259;

see also Arnett v. Ricketts, 665 F.Supp. at 1444 (rap sheet and
prison records were hearsay which did not establish aggravating
circumstance).
The State argued:
PROSECUTOR JONES: Another mitigating factor in
the State is a lack of criminal record. Again,
that is not a factor because the Court knows
about Ralph Menzies' prior record.
T. 3209.
The trial judge expressly relied on the rap sheets in
sentencing Appellant to death.
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JUDGE UNO: Then prior criminal history,
76-3-207(2)(a), one, there was an extensive
juvenile court record from 4-13-66, at the age of
seven when he was initially referred essentially
because he needed to have a place to stay, up
until approximately December 1st of 1975, and it
may be sometime in 1976. In between that time
there are approximately 38 referrals made.
Two, and sometime in 1976, he was certified
to the district court.
Three, there was extensive criminal record.
T. 3250.

This unreliable and inadmissible evidence was important to

the judge's decision and prejudicial to Mr. Menzies; a new penalty
hearing is required.
POINT XXXII. ADMISSION OF GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS
OF THE BODY WAS ERROR.
Despite this Court's recognition in Lafferty, 749 P.2d at
1256, 1259, that photographs of a corpse have a strong propensity to
prejudice the fact finder and its application of Rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence in both the guilt and penalty phases, the State
asks the Court to essentially overrule its decision in Lafferty and
allow gruesome photographs of the body during the penalty phase.
The State offers no convincing argument for overruling recent
precedent.

See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey , 505 U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 931, 120 L.Ed.2d 676, 699-700 (1992) (recognizing
importance of precedent and outlining circumstances to be considered
when determining whether to overrule a decision).
The heightened need for reliability in the penalty phase of
a capital trial and the requirement that persons eligible be
narrowed and decisions carefully channeled suggest that exclusion of
prejudicial and inflammatory photographs of a corpse are as critical
in the penalty phase as they are in the guilt/innocence phase of a
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capital trial.
The State claims that the photographs were required to
establish the heinousness aggravator.

However, as outlined supra at

51-4 and in Appellants opening brief at 158-63, the heinousness
aggravator is applicable only where the State establishes torture or
serious physical abuse or bodily injury before death.

These

photographs do not establish any of the required elements.

Indeed,

the medical examiner's testimony was the best evidence on the role
of the wounds.
The photographs are also of minimal if any relevance to the
heinousness aggravator or any other issue since they do not show the
wounds as they actually occurred and instead show wounds that gape
more and dark patterns which appear to be wounds but are not.
T. 1669.

The State claims that the fact that the photographs did

not accurately depict the wounds was not misleading because
Dr. Sweeney explained "this fact and its cause" at trial.

State's

brief at 182 fn. 68. Regardless of whether the photographs were
misleading, they lacked probative value because of their failure to
accurately depict the wounds.
Furthermore, Dr. Sweeney's guilt/innocence phase testimony
failed to adequately clarify the problems with the photographs which
would be introduced later, during the penalty phase.

While

Dr. Sweeney did talk generally about the difference between the
actual wounds and the wounds after the autopsy was performed, his
testimony during the guilt/innocence phase did not relate directly
to the photographs and did not outline the specific problems with
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the photographs.
In addition, while the judge presided over the jury trial
during the guilt/innocence phase, he was not yet aware that he was
to be the fact finder in the penalty phase.34

Under such

circumstances, Dr. Sweeney's testimony failed to explain for the
judge that the photographs did not provide an accurate
representation of the wounds.
The State's own argument emphasizes the importance of
limiting the use of gruesome photographs in a penalty phase.
State argues that

lf

[e]vidence communicating the nature and

circumstances of the crime will frequently be gruesome.
gruesome act.11

The

Murder is a

State's brief at 182-3.

While murder is gruesome, the goal of the penalty phase is
to select those gruesome murders which, within eighth amendment and
due process guidelines, warrant the death penalty.

The State's

argument does not support wholesale admission of such gruesome
photos; rather, it suggests that since all murders are gruesome in
their own way, the use of photographs of the body of a murder victim
must be carefully limited so that horror or other emotional
reactions in viewing the photographs do not unduly prejudice the
fact finder in assessing sentence.35

34. Indeed, the death qualification procedure utilized during
voir dire suggested that the judge would not be the penalty phase
fact finder.
35. Although "the State assumes for purposes of this argument that
the photographs in question are gruesome" (State's brief at 178) and
recognizes the gruesome nature of almost all photographs of murder
victims, it is interesting to note that the State has chosen to
compare the photographs admitted in the present case with the
(continued)
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The State also argues that since a judge, not jury, looked
at these photographs, no prejudice occurred.
183-4.

State's brief at

While a judge may have to examine a photograph in order to

make the admissibility determination, his cursory examination for
that purpose is different than the examination made in determining
whether the homicide was heinous or whether the photographs
otherwise supported a death sentence.
In addition, although the State would like this Court to
presume that the trial judge relied on only admissible evidence
(State's brief at 183-4), such a presumption is not appropriate
where the record establishes that the judge admitted inadmissible
evidence and may well have relied on the photographs in finding the
heinousness aggravator.

The photographs may well have impacted on

the judge's determination that the heinousness aggravator applied.
The problems with admitting these photographs are not minimized by
the fact that this penalty phase was tried to the judge; reliance on
the photos to find an aggravating circumstance results in reversible
error.

(Footnote 35 continued)
gruesome photograph of a war victim which was placed on the cover of
a national magazine to emphasize the atrocities of that war.
State's brief at 178 fn. 64. The State seems to suggest in footnote
64 that perhaps the photographs in the instant case are not gruesome
because "they are comparable to a photograph recently appearing on
the cover of Newsweek magazine." On the contrary, the magazine
cover selected by the State, which it acknowledges is comparable to
the photographs at issue, is gruesome, shocking and intended to
evoke an emotional response. It was selected for the cover for that
very reason. Although this magazine cover is not part of the record
in the instant case, it supports Appellant's argument that the
gruesome photographs should not have been admitted.
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POINT XXXIII. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S RELIANCE ON
SPECULATION THAT APPELLANT MIGHT BE PAROLED
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY HEARING.
The State claims that the prosecutor "made a 'what if7
argument which was amply supported" by the evidence.

State's brief

at 186. A "what if argument" is speculation; speculation should not
be considered in determining whether to sentence an individual to
death.

As Appellant pointed out in his opening brief, there is no

evidence in this case that Appellant would be paroled.36
Appellant's opening brief at 176-7.
In Young, 853 P.2d at 421, Justice Stewart recognized that
"[s]ociety can protect itself by imprisoning dangerous people for
life."

In a footnote, Justice Stewart emphasized that argument by

prosecutors that the death penalty should be imposed because the
defendant might be paroled and kill again
... is disingenuous, unprofessional, and improper
and should be prohibited by all trial judges. It
assumes that the Board of Pardons will not keep
those who are a danger to others in prison, for
life if necessary. Nothing in the history of the
State of Utah indicates that the Board has been
remiss in its duty.
Id. at 421 fn.4; see also Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165, 1185
(Ala. Cr. App. 1990) (improper for prosecutor to argue possibility
of parole).
The State claims that Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561, is on
point, suggesting that this issue involves "invited error."

State's

36. Appellant's argument in footnote 72 of his opening brief at 177
was intended to state that the prosecutor argued that Ralph might
get out of prison at the age of 49, and that such argument was a
misstatement of the evidence. A portion of the prosecutor's
argument was inadvertently omitted from Appellant's opening brief.
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brief at 186.

The record does not support this claim.

In his

initial closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the judge
should impose death because the Board of Pardons might parole
Mr. Menzies.

The trial judge relied on the possibility of parole in

imposing sentence:
Life imprisonment is no guarantee. The Board of
Pardons may release or parole in spite of
recommendations. He may escape. Average
commitment 20 years. Defendant in for two
five-to-life's and out in six years.
T. 3254.
Speculation that the Board of Pardons will not do its job
and will prematurely release a person convicted of murder is not a
proper basis for imposing a death sentence.

See People v. Holman#

469 N.E.2d 119, 134,135 (111. 1984); Young, 853 P.2d at 421
(Stewart, J.).
POINT XXXV. SPECULATION THAT THE DEFENDANT MIGHT
ESCAPE IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR IMPOSING DEATH.
The State did not present any evidence that any person has
ever escaped from Uintah, the current maximum security facility at
the Utah State Prison.

Nor did the State present any evidence that

Ralph Menzies would be housed in any unit other than the maximum
security facility if he were sentenced to life.

Appellant's single

escape involved a walkaway from a minimum security unit a number a
years ago.

Under these circumstances, the State's argument that

Ralph might escape and therefore should be sentenced to death was
speculation which was not supported by the evidence.
In Howard v. State, 800 P.2d 175, 178 (Nev. 1990), the
Court pointed out that in Collier v. State, 705 P.2d 1126, 1130
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(Nev. 1985), it held that the "prospect of escape is not part of the
calculus that the jury should consider in determining a defendant's
sentence."

In Howard, the court modified the Collier rule, stating

that it would allow such argument if supported by the evidence.
Despite this modification, the court held in Howard that the
argument was improper because it was not supported by the evidence.
The trial judge's reliance on this prejudicial argument
that Appellant might escape if given a life sentence requires a new
penalty hearing.
POINT XXXVI. IMPROPER ARGUMENT REQUIRES A NEW
PENALTY PHASE.
While the State cites cases from other jurisdictions which
it claims allow argument comparing the defendant to notorious
killers (State's brief at 190), it disregards the controlling case
law from this Court.

In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah

1984), this Court held that
The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he
compared the defendant to Hinckley. Such a
comparison could have no effect other than to
prejudice the jury.
Id. at 486.

Based on the comparison and other misconduct, this

Court reversed the conviction in Troy.

See also State v. Palmer,

218 Utah Adv. Rep. 19; State v. Emmettf 831 P.2d 731 (Utah 1992).
The State's reliance on a 1976 psychological report found
in the prison file at E8:105 to establish that Appellant was a
psychopath further demonstrates the weakness of this claim and the
unreliability of the prison file. A social worker interviewed a
seventeen-year-old Ralph Menzies three times during an eight-day
period in February, 1976, for the purpose of assisting the court in
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deciding whether to certify Appellant to stand trial as an adult.
In his "Impressions and Recommendations/1 the social worker

E8:105.
stated,

lf

I believe there is ample evidence for a psychopathic

deviant, character-disordered diagnosis."

The State claims that

this ancient, double hearsay based on the social worker's
impressions of a juvenile Ralph Menzies spawned and made acceptable
the prosecutor's extensive argument on psychopaths and comparisons
to psychopathic killers.

State's brief at 190-1.

Such unreliable

evidence should play no role in sentencing an individual to death.
See generally Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (reliance on double
hearsay evidence at sentencing violates due process).
Finally, the State again argues that because this was a
bench trial, the improper argument did not matter.

If this Court

were to accept the State's argument, it would be an invitation for
improper argument in bench trials.

Trial judges are human beings;

they can be swayed by emotions and prejudice just as other human
beings can be so swayed.

This particular judge was relatively new

to the district court bench when he tried this case and had never
tried a capital case.
evidence.

He admitted and relied upon inadmissible

Under such circumstances, it cannot be presumed that this

argument did not affect himf especially in light of his explicit
concern that Ralph might escape or be paroled.
POINT XXXVII. ADMISSION OF VICTIM IMPACT
EVIDENCE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Although Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 2597,

115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), held that the federal constitution did not
bar the admission of victim impact evidence during the penalty
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phase, it did not approve the use of victim impact evidence in the
guilt phase of a capital trial.

See Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d

1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992) ("Consideration of victim-impact testimony or
argument remains inappropriate during proceedings determining the
guilt of an accused" after Payne); Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d
793, 796 (Ky. 1992) (conviction reversed where victim impact
evidence introduced in guilt phase); Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d at
1184 (comments during guilt phase regarding boys' loss of their
father highly improper and prejudicial).

In the present case, some

of the victim impact evidence regarding Ms. Hunsaker's young
children and unemployed husband came in during the guilt/innocence
phase (T. 975-6, 978-9, 982, 988) in violation of Mr. Menzies' right
to due process and a fair trial.
Although this Court acknowledged the decision in Payne v.
Tennessee in its decision in Young, 853 P.2d at 353, it did not
address the state constitutional argument, as outlined in
Appellant's opening brief at 186-7.
This error should have been obvious to the trial judge
since Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), was in effect at the
time this case was tried, and the prejudicial impact of such
evidence during the guilt phase is obvious.

The fact that Booth was

later overruled does not affect the obviousness of this error.
Admission of this evidence during the guilt/innocence phase
requires a new trial.

See Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d at 796

(reversing conviction after victim impact evidence admitted in
guilt/innocence phase).

In addition, reliance by the judge on this
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victim impact evidence in sentencing Appellant to death (T. 3265,
3259) requires a new penalty phase, under the Utah constitution.
POINT XXXVIII. THE TESTIMONY OF DR. SMITH
VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
The testimony of Dr. Smith in the present case evidenced
the same sort of unreliability as the ISAT report condemned by this
Court in Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-8.

Accordingly,

admission of the testimony violated due process.
POINT XXXXI. THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
IN THIS CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE.
The death penalty has been imposed in Utah on only one
other person who committed a murder during the commission of a
robbery and who has not committed any other murders.
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989).

See State v.

By contrast, in other cases

where the death penalty has been imposed, the defendant had either
committed other murders or committed the homicide while in the
commission of a more atrocious aggravating circumstance or under
more atrocious circumstances.
Although the State suggests that Appellant's criminal
history is sufficiently aggravating to justify a death sentence
under the circumstances of this case, a review of the cases in which
the death penalty has been imposed in Utah, affidavits presented by
defense counsel as Defendant's Exhibit 35, and other Utah cases in
which the defendant received a sentence less than death demonstrates
that a violent criminal history coupled with a robbery aggravating
circumstance is not usually sufficient for a death sentence.37

37.

Footnote on following page.
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MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENT
POINT XXXXII. DEATH QUALIFICATION VIOLATES THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Although a majority of this Court upheld the death
qualification procedure utilized in Young, 853 P.2d 327, three
members expressed concern about the procedure and its impact on a
defendant's right to a fair trial.

Id. at 386-95.

To the extent

that a majority of this Court might be persuaded by further evidence
regarding the impact on juries and possible alternatives, Appellant
Menzies respectfully requests that this Court remand this case for
an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
POINT XXXXIII. THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In Young, 853 P.2d 327, four members of this Court held
that Utah's death penalty scheme is constitutional; one justice
recognized the unconstitutionality of Utah's statutory scheme.
Despite the majority opinion, and for purposes of preserving this
issue for federal review, Appellant Menzies continues to maintain
that Utah's death penalty scheme violates federal due process and
the eighth amendment.

37. The Hofmann case ("intentionally killed two people with bombs
that endangered others") is just one example of the more notorious
cases in which a defendant has not been sentenced to death in this
state.

- 71

-

CONCLDSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Menzies respectfully
requests that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.

SUBMITTED this /3iUL day of October, 1993.

^U^C.cdBf
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RICHARD G. UDAY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

I

THE COURT:

As to the panel as to a whole?

J

M S . BERGESON:

J

THE COURT:

J

You do.

Evelyn, would you ask Mr.

Cole to come in, please?

J
J

Yeah.

EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE
By the Court:

7

Q.

Good morning, Mr. Cole.

Have you a chair

8

please, sir.

9

everybody in the last couple of days that's in here in

Mr. Cole, I think you've probably seen

10

the courtroom.

11

inquire a little further on some matters that may be

12

considered sensitive, and so we thought we'd have this

13

out of the presence of all the other potential jurors.

14

want to ask you a few questions, and explain some of the

15

process in a little more detail, and then if counsel have

16

additional questions, I'll give them an opportunity to

17|

put those to you as well.

18

As I mentioned yesterday, we need to

I

First, there was a couple of things to clear up what

19

may have been by way of innuendo the day before.

20

may have been some suggestion that this case was the same

21

case that you may have read about it the newspaper or

221

heard on the TV where the fellow was hiding out in the

23

mountains of West Virginia.

24

case?

25

A.

There

Did you ever hear about that

NO.

Page 8
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CSR, RPR

Q.

This is not t h a t c a s e .

So, if you didn't

hear about it, don't w o r r y about it.

A n d also there w a s

some suggestion that some of the jurors knew Mr- Young

—

potential jurors knew M r . Young's r e l a t i v e s here in t o w n .
A.

Yes ^

Q.

A n d the fact of the m a t t e r i s , M r . Y o u n g has

no relatives in the State of U t a h .
makes any d i f f e r e n c e .

I don't k n o w if that

I w a n t e d to c l e a r t h o s e things up

because the parties a g r e e d to that.
A.

The reason w h y I m e n t i o n e d that is I did w o r k

with some Youngs at one t i m e fifteen —
12
13
14

sixteen years

ago.
Q.

I b e l i e v e you said that y o u thought you k n e w

maybe the defendant's father?

15

A.

Father.

Yeah.

M

Q*

But in any case, I w a n t e d to clear that up

17j

with you that he does not have any r e l a t i v e s in the State

18

so that must have been some other Y o u n g .

19

A.

20

the father.

21|

faces.

22

W e l l , you know, he looked q u i t e a bit like
That's —

THE C O U R T :

23

job, t o o .

241

particularly B u n n y ' s .

25

y o u know.

I know.

Some of m y b u s i n e s s e s

A n d you do an excellent

You could do a little b e t t e r on m y legs but

—

Y o u ' l l r e c a l l , M r . Cole, that you

mentioned yesterday t h a t the defendant in this case is
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jl

charged w i t h c r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e , c a p i t a l c r i m e , m u r d e r in

2

the first d e g r e e .

3

and t h e o n l y o n e in this State is m u r d e r , a n d o n l y then

4

certain t y p e s of m u r d e r s , h a v e t h e p o t e n t i a l of t h e

5

imposition of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y .

6

q u e s t i o n s about that, a n d w e ' r e t a l k i n g h y p o t h e t i c a l l y ,

7

a s s u m i n g t h e jury e v e r g o t t o t h e p o i n t o f h a v i n g t o m a k e

8

that d e c i s i o n .

9

b a c k t o that in just a m o m e n t .

10

A n d a n y c r i m e t h a t is a capital c r i m e ,

So w e n e e d t o a s k s o m e

T h e jury m a y o r m a y n o t .

A n d I'll come

W i t h regard t o y o u r f e e l i n g s t o w a r d t h e d e a t h

11

penalty, y o u ' l l recall y e s t e r d a y I a s k e d t h e question

12

generally of t h e p a n e l as t o a n y of t h o s e that w e r e so

13

u n a l t e r a b l y o p p o s e d t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e death

14

p e n a l t y that i n no c o n c e i v a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e could t h e y

15

ever impose i t . A n d y o u w e r e n o t o n e of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s

16

that r a i s e d y o u r hand i n d i c a t i n g y o u fell into that

17

category; is that correct, sir?

18

A.

That's t r u e .

19

Q.

H o w w o u l d y o u d e s c r i b e y o u r feelings t o w a r d

20

the death penalty, then, M r . Cole?

21

in f a v o r of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , s o m e w h a t in favor of t h e

22

death p e n a l t y , somewhat o p p o s e d t o t h e d e a t h penalty, o r

23

strongly o p p o s e d t o t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y ?

|

24
2

5

Would you say you're

A.

I'm in f a v o r of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y .

Q.

In o u r system of laws in t h i s State, M r .
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X

Cole, there are only certain specified circumstances

2

where one person kills another that are considered to be

3

capital or first degree murder crimes, and the

41

legislature has clearly idendified which of those

5

circumstances apply.

61

particular —

7

category, or a specific circumstance, it would not fall .

81

into the category of first degree murder, it would be

9

second degree murder, or manslaughter or something else.

In other words, without some

unless the killing falls into a specific

10

So, there are some homicides that are —

11

penalty is not available.

12

some other penalty, some lesser penalty.

13

understand that?

that the death

In other words, it would be
Do you

14

A.

Yes.

Uh huh (Affirmative).

15

Q.

Regardless of you're feeling and personal

16

beliefs towards the the death penalty, and it's merit or

17

lack of merit, Mr. Cole, if you were chosen as a trial

18

juror in this case do you believe that you'd be able to

19

set aside any personal or moral beliefs that you may have

20

and evaluate the evidence in this case in accordance with

21

the instructions of law that I would give to you, and

22

consider those along with your determination as to the

23

what the facts are in this case, and determine what might

24J

be the appropriate penalty —

25

jury has found the defendant guilty of capital murder

this all assumes that the
—

Page
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and decide whether life imprisonment or the death penalty
was appropriate?

Would you be able to set aside any

3

personal feelings about M R 1 'ic-^t'h pMnfl 'l V . ,,:t,, * f n " ' rm ' lle

4

law, and follow your own determinations of the facts, and

5

then decide whether death penalty was appropriate, or
i

....

ate?

would believe
8J

U

Has there ever been any time in your life,

9

»I e

10

a

i;i«

11

y*

Mi • Cole, rlo you Ikive am / persona I libel j.et u

iLlifit ", rjniii have been,, opposed to the death penalty?

12

from whatever origin, and that might be religious on

ij

philosophical or something else, that one who takes the

14

m e

I:: f. ::)i:fei t h :i s ow i:i ] i £e to en hance h is

ISi

position in the hereafter, if you believe in the

16

hereafter?

1"1
18

A.

dhance.

themselves primarily

I would Snjy sjive peace to

That's the belief.

19

Q.

so it would be a personal th i ng?

Zl1

A.

Yeah.

21

Q•

Do you consider yourself to be a religious

1

22

person, sir?

23

No.

24

25

It wonl d be a personal thing.

0
oi

Not really.

Without identifying which, are you a member

f o rqan i z cell i e. I, j g j o 11 a I II; Li w p i, e s e lit t: line ?
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ji

A*

Yeah, I'm a member of the LDS church.

2

Q*

Would you describe yourself as active,
'/

3

moderately active, inactive?

4

A.

Somewhat active.

5

Q.

If you were a member of a jury panel that

61

determined after hearing all the facts and considering

7

the law imposed a death penalty, would you be concerned

81

that you might be criticized by your peers, or associates

9

because of that decision?

101

A.

No.

11

Q.

Let me ask the reverse.

If you were a member

12

of a jury panel that after considering the facts and the

13

law on the case determined that the appropriate penalty

14

was life imprisonment as opposed to the death penalty,

15

would you be concerned about being criticized in that

16

light as well?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Mr. Cole, I indicated the other day, or

19

indicated yesterday, that there's a possibility that this

20

case may go as long as three weeks, and that puts us at

21

the middle of June.

22J

to June, but we are.

23

there's a lot of factors that plug into that.

24

best guess on the outside.

25

that would prohibit you from giving your full attention

I didn't realize we were that close
This case could go that long.

And

That's our

Are there any circumstances
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r~

2]

^v.1 c r»A??A ff y o u ' r e chosen as t r i a l juror a n d w e h a d

to g o until t h e m i d d l e of June?

J

A.

There is o n e possibil i tj of somethinq that:

4J

has b e e n p l a n n e d f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w o years

5

just came home from t h e i r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e P h i l i p p i n e s f
"" M u e f LIT I1. ' """ ""

A
7

L a k e Powell area

planned a iiaxuiiy .reunion au wn

. b e l i e v e , b e g i n n i n g June 11th.

81

L*

I b e l i e v e that's a S u n d a y .

9

A.

I • 11 no !:::: su 1: e

ICi

<•

Sunday o r M o n d a y .

11

My 111-laws

M S . BERGESONi • 1 t h i n k it's a Sunday.

12

A.

That w a s t h e d a y that, y o u know, everything

13

was supposed

14

Q.

crank u p a n d g e t g o i n g .
t e hopefu ] • i)f bei ng abJ e to

attend that w h e n JL. started a t L a k e Powell?
16

ft

Yes

17

'

18
19

w
What

22

23J
24
25

Because t h e

.. » q E I tie a b i t: money J U u n k .

They a r e about $1,500 a w e e k as I r e c a l l .

- -!^juS case went a couple of days longer than that?

20
21

* 1 (affirmative).

~;now that ,1 t would, b u t if i t: did, could you, join
-,. g r o u p

;. some way ""?
11 h I m 11 m a i: £ i rma f:,i v e ) .

A.

O h , ye s.

Q.

Y o u wouldn 1 t loose iiiie whole w e e k If you,, h a d

to g o a d a y late?
A.

No,
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-I
2
J

Q.

Any other problems that might interfere with

your ability to serve as a trial juror in this case?
A.

Well, my primary occupation requires me to be

4

out-of-state quite a bit, and I do have responsibilities

5

as far as, you know, making contact with my dealers, and

6

et cetera.

7

not sure, but I'm sure he would consider the

8

circumstances.

9
10

Q»

So how my employer would feel about that, I'm

If that became a problem, I have some

leverage in that regard.

11

A.

I thought you may.

12

Q.

And as a matter of fact, all jurors are

13

protected by law in this State.

And while I realize that

14

there's some subtleties that you may not be able to

15

control, the courts don't stand for a minute anyone being

16

prejudiced by having to —

17

concerned, by having to serve because the person doesn't

18

have a choice.

as far as their employment is

19

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

20

Q.

So we're very, very sensitive to that, and

21

usually employers, even those that are very unreasonable,

22

once they get a phone call from the Judge tend to get

23

real reasonable.

J

24
25

So, —

and besides, as I recall your

position, it's one of considerable importance.

And I

think your employer isn't going to prejudice his business
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r

%_**mffmCt'inct

you

But in any event, if that became a

.Qbltrr1/ i i :i.i:i Id work it out.

All right*

Very good.

Shepherd, anything further?
MR. SHEPHERD:
EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE
ly Mr- Shepherd:
Q.

Prior to being picked... on this jury panel, in

the p a s t 11rfv«' y" '111 "" v (J in 11 a d i K:t , a s i o n t :::: h a e s e \: i o 111 •

discussions with your friends hbout the death penalty?
A.
there's

Yeah

the past, we have

-

=

you know, customers
discussions on —
Q#

You know,

I, i.mey t Ilia t, ei I: he

~,

lients, friends, we'll have

we've had discussions on death penalty.

Tn +-b^ course of those discussions, what has

been important
deci si on.

*

. respect to making the
. ,

as to whether or not yrm

favored it or didn't favor ^ *
&

I really feel the most important thing to me

concernmq the death penalty in thai if is
for the person who had committed the crime.

ILilie atonement
For me, if I

— if it was myself, and I happened to take someone elses
H

fe

I "! ior , I : t:i i I iik , 1 wt i :i ] cii 1 ii ke t o J i v e w L Iti t ha t, t;c t i,

the rest of my life.

L think

that than actual"

e iny 1 JI

r ^ more punishment to do

Are there any other things that would be a

BUNNY "• NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR
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jl

major concern to you in making that kind of decision?

21

A.

3
41

Mo.
MR. SHEPHERD:

questions.

5

THE COURT:

61
7

10
11

Ms. Bergeson?

EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE
By Ms. Bergeson:

81
9

Thank you, I have no further

Q.

This like an atonement for the other person

idea, is this something —

how have you come to feel this

way?
A.

It's just a personal feeling.

It's something

12

that I, you know, it's something I feel that the

13

punishment should fit the crime.

14

it's not that, you know, you want to take the rights away

15

from different people, it's something that life is the

16

most important thing here upon this earth, and for

17

someone to take it away, then that should be repaid by

18

the most valuable thing that you may be able to give, and

19

that is your own life.

20

basically feel about it.

21

22
23

|

24
25

Q.

Okay.

And whether, you know,

And I think that's how I

So that if you're convinced that

somebody else has intentionally murdered another
A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q.

—

—

then you would feel that the proper

penalty in terms of the person's ability to be salvaged
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l\

would b e t h e death penalty?

21

,,,,...,.... w a y :

3

•

intentionally, m a y b e

.

> know,

'mean b y that

- nurder came about:

If it w a s

gruesome, preplanned, a n d a h o r r i b l e w a y t o cii.p, yew,
w < lit: ] • ::i fee] \ e:i: 5 strongly f o r t h a t .

IC

If I t w a s primarily

-• if it w a s i n anger, o r s o m e t h i n g b e y o n d t h e control of
the person, well, I IIMII I wunul ha\e. I o nil back mui
thin k, and say*

w e l l , this p e r s o n w a s not i n control o f

himself, a n d m a y b e h e needs m e n t a l , o r p h y s i c a l help, a n d
tJirii H U H v

i uipi m / f »

in m e a n ,

1 iuiiiiii1 iii.rii*f* i 1) w a s t e a l i f e

because of a person being sick.

But when someone does It

purposefully, then I have, y ou know, he's mentally okay,
1*1

ami everyr-hing i-vi.se is, y ou know, h e m a d e that choice.

15

A n d so when h e m a d e that choice, I t h i n k h e should know

16

-... should have known w h a t the conseqi lences ;#e;i: e go i rig to

17

18

l,i

Q.

Okay.

W e i ] , net s assume that there is a —

19

a p e r s o n acts somewhi 1

20

as m a l i c i o u s as w h a t you've d e s c r i b e d .

21

think p e r s o n a l l y that t h e p e r s o n should atone for the

22

other,

23 .

c: i s 1 ij 1a t

A.

n|,I\pi,,1

-

iat it's not

W o u l d y o u still

—

If he i s a sane p e r s o n , and i t happened — i f

24J

i t was not c

25

a gi: tiesorae deatr

IOW should T e x p l a i n t h i s ?

If in wiis in01:

mean — you know, i f I t was just
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il

someone shooting someone else because of being out of

2|

control, then I really feel that a second look, as far as

3

the death penalty should be — should occur.

4

don't feel that, you know, just because a life was taken

51

that it should be taken*

61

purposefully, and with afore thought, and everything

71

else, yes, I do.

81
91

Q.

I just

If — but if it was taken

I think the life should be taken.

Have you ever — you've said that you've

never opposed the death penalty?

10 j

A.

No.

11

Q.

Have you ever given any serious question to

12

the wisdom of it?

13

you're view?

141

A.

15

Q.

16

A.

17

Q.

18

Have you ever had any doubts about

No.
That's a solid

thing?

Yes.
You indicated to Judge Hanson that you were

in favor of it?

19

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

20

Q.

And I gather from what you've been telling me

21

that that would be strongly in favor of it?

22

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). That's true.

23

Q.

Not somewhat?

24

A.

That's — that's right.

25

Q.

Now, let me ask again.

1

Strongly.
I know we've gone
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1
2
31
4I

l|)l|IIP,

, i ,..l,l. Je "ML ' r! LI,,, ,

r1 ,

d e u .:,.i • tie a t o n e m e n t

for the person, does that have any religious basis for
yon?
A.

I think so, l think so

think somewhere

5|

back in my childhood, or whatever, you know

61

there are some Scriptures, you know, dealing *

7

And I Lliiiik ml " :« probably part of my upbringing*

81

Q.

Kind of an eye for an eye type —

91

A.

N o .Not~

think

i I:' «i Nii.illy d i f f e r e n t '

i liat;.

I'ti's n o t

10

an eye for an eye, it's atonement for a life primarily is

11

what it is.

12

other punishmeivl i I hat die • that can he worse.

13

0.

14

|
I
J

"

It's not an eye for an eye.

LiLke what?
Living with i t .

15 J

i|e imprisonment then?

161

Jh huh (affirmative!).
Q.

Might be worse than death, | I'-nalty?

A.
1

I think there's

i"b /affirmative). Especially —

depending on the circumstances, and what came about.
mat c

ID«:J

I

i |i>eii(j J i. "i1 i. Lid i w o u l d a c t u a l l y b e

t.han having to have your life taken.
22

23J
24
25

Q.

Do

is appropriate
A
Q.

think that the death penalty
>es ot.lier than,, murder?

No.
L e t ' s assume we have cin i n t e n t i o n s J

aoraewhai
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J

malicious h o m i c i d e .

Would you be willing, or able, I

2

think y o u ' d p r o b a b l y b e w i l l i n g , b u t w o u l d y o u b e a b l e in

3

all h o n e s t y to c o n s i d e r a n y i n f o r m a t i o n , good i n f o r m a t i o n

4

about t h e p e r s o n t o p e r s u a d e y o u t h a t s o m e t h i n g o t h e r

51

than death w a s a p p r o p r i a t e ?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

So in y o u r v i e w , o n c e y o u ' v e m a d e that

81

threshold d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h i s is a —

what you've

9]

described as a m a l i c i o u s , i n t e n t i o n a l , p l a n n e d

10

intentional type of h o m i c i d e , y o u w o u l d n ' t b e able t o

11

consider life?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Do y o u —

let's a s s u m e that y o u felt t h a t y o u

14

had concluded that t h e h o m i c i d e w a s committed say u n d e r

15

extreme —

under d i s t r e s s , o r w i t h o u t control?

16

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

17

Q.

D o y o u c o n s i d e r y o u r s e l f a leader or a

18

follower?

19

A.

I think a leader.

20

Q.

D o y o u f e e l that if y o u say w e r e in t h e

21

m i n o r i t y in a g r o u p s i t u a t i o n , h a v i n g different f e e l i n g s

22

than t h e vast m a j o r i t y , d o y o u t h i n k —

23

you'd respond to a s i t u a t i o n like that?

24

question your judgment?

25

another look?

how do you think
Would you

W o u l d y o u sit b a c k a n d t a k e

What would you do?
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A.

I've always been outspoken, and I would

r e a l l y l e t p e o p l e k n o w wlidl, my |irtr i u a Jar f e e l i n g s wer e
3!

-

:he matter.

41

And If I felt that: a person was innocent,

'Urtml up for that right, and say, this is how J
. eally feel.

This is how T ye 1 ill Mi ij liaci.s, aiicn I think

•*.e - ..nnocent.

If I feel the-person is guilty, well,

w o n I, I .nii-n1 lii" «" 1 ,. j u i l t y .
4 [J
i

So you won't question your own judgment<
feel pretty solid about your own judgment?

0
111

I • :)ii

A.

judgment.

Everyone does.

Then it -•- then the thing

- ^ *« t

go

back ov er the facts, and try to find out where you do
111
*

have questions.
-

is murder,

i"l.'M
1

*>

17
18|

And 1.11 en y o n Inave

y o n know

anything else! it's very serious.

"K-

w udu u be taken lightly

l think that you have to weigh ail
try to make t* *•
Q.

a crime

-

,

Something

h* in ",| y

•! " i1"1'

judgment possible.
know in" have yn i ever had any

19

connection with exposure to people with mental health

20

problems?

21

A*

Yes.

22

Q

In what context?

23

A.

I have a brother-in-law that is manic

24

'51

And

depressive.
j.

And how do you feel about that?
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1

A.

There are times I'd love to bonk him in the

2

nose, but —

3

because we've been the surrogate parents to, you know, my

4

in-laws have been in the Philippines, and I understand

5

that it is a medical problem, and not, you know a

6

physical problem —

7

problem that he has a chemical imbalance, and he has a

8

tough time making correct judgements.

9

be understanding, and try to help him, you know, the best

it's been very hard on my wife and I,

a mental problem.

It is a medical

And so I have to

10

that I can.

11

can go to.

12

than the average, and I understand the situation.

13
14
15

Q.

I mean everyone only has certain limits they
But seems like I do have a little bit more

Do you have faith in psychologists, and

psychiatrists?
A.

Good ones.

Let's put it that way.

16

some out there that I myself wouldn't go see.

17

are other good ones that do a very good job.

18

Q.

There are
But there

Have you ever felt personally with problems

19

in your own life that you might be compelled, or feel

20

like you'd want to go see a counselor?

21

A.

Oh, sure.

in their life.

I think everyone does at one time

I think counseling is good.

Being able

23

to get things off your chest, and have someone else take,

24

you know, an outsider's look at you, help direct you.

5

Q.

Have you ever gone to a counselor?
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J

A.

No.

I haven't.

Not yet.

2I

Q.

Maybe after today?

3

A.

Yes.

J

Q.

if you were selected as a juror in this case,

51

tell me maybe some of the things that would make you a

51

good juror in your view.

7

A.

I've always been fair.

I listen.

I've

8

always had the capability of being able to weigh the

91

facts, you know, whether it's —

10

—

you know.

11

fair.

12
13

Q.

A.

Oh, I have many.
THE COURT:

As far as jury service is

concerned.

17

A.

18

20

The most important thing, I've always been

What do you think might be some of your

15

19

I just

poorer qualities, if any?

14

16

whatever it is.

As jury service?
THE COURT:

If there are any.

Limit it just to

that.
A.

Maybe sleeping in court.

I think all of us

21

do have a certain amount of prejudice within ourselves,

22 J

and I think whether or not we feel it consciously, you
know, it's always there, subconsciously.

I think, you

241

know, that could be one of my faults, because my

25

background of being brought up is obeying the law, and
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•I

doing what I'm supposed to.

71

quite a bit in the last few years having teen-agers that

3|

you have to learn tolerance, and understanding.

41

forgiveness, and et cetera, all the way.

51

being the type of father I've been, you know, I've lacked

5

in some of those areas.

7

areas.

8

law, and you should obey it.

91

And I, you know, I learned

And

And I think

And I think that's one of those

I may be too strict because, you know, a law is a

Q. (By Ms. Bergeson)

Okay.

Let me ask one final

10

question.

Let's assume the situation where you have

11

concluded that maybe a person acts out of control.

12

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

13

Q.

But you have information that they've acted

14

repeatedly out of control.

15

violence.

16

homicides in the worst situation.

17

what you've told us already?

18 J

A.

And assume that prior acts of

Prior acts say even of homicide, say repeated
How with that impact

If facts were brought that that person acted

19

out of control on continuous, you know, previous

20

occasions, and that person sought professional help, and

21

they still, you know, it still occurred, well then I

22

would blame it on the person.

J

If no professional help

came in, then I would say that that person needs some
24

type of professional help.

25

lenient as far as my judgements would be towards that

I think I would be more

Page 103
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

1
2
3

kind of person for the simple reason, you know, there
again, we all have to learn tolerances, and forgiveness,
and we have to weigh the facts.

And I think that if it

4

can be proven that that person does have a problem, then

5

I think you have to look at that.

6

MS. BERGESON:

7

THE COURT:

10

Thank you.

Anything further from the State?

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE

8
91

Okay.

By Mr. Shepherd:.
Q.

Let me ask just one more question.

You've

11

expressed some fairly strong opinions regarding the death

12

penalty when you feel it would be appropriate.

13

came to the situation where you subjectively felt the

14

death penalty was necessary, or appropriate, and at the

15

same time you felt intellectually that the court's

161

instructions led you to doubt that under the court's

17

instructions it should be a death penalty, what would

18

your decision be?

19
20
21
22
23

A.

If you

You said the court's instructions that it

should be a death penalty?
Q.

It should not be a death penalty, but you

felt it subjectively should.
A.

Like I say, a law is a law, and the man

24

sitting on the bench is the head honcho.

25

that I'd have to go with the judgment of the Judge.

I really feel
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MR. SHEPHERD:

1
t

A.

Thank you.

I would have to.

Because he and yourself

know more about the law than I do.

And I would have to

9
4

rely upon his judgment.
MR. SHEPHERD:

9

THE COURT:

f

No further questions.

Mr. Cole, thank you very much.

The

way we're handling this is we'll make a determination
f

later as to what prospective jurors need to return to

9

determine who will finally be on this panel.

And so let

10

me ask you to do this:

11

contrary, let me ask you to return to this courtroom on

121

next Wednesday at 9 a.m.

13

MR. COLE:

14

THE COURT:

Unless you hear from us to the

Okay.
If for some reason we determine

15

that you cannot serve in this case, then I'll have one of

16

my court personal call you so you don't have to make a

17

trip in here for nothing.

18

MR. COLE:

19

THE COURT:

20

Thank goodness.
I appreciate it, and thank you

for your talent and effort so far.

21

(Juror left the room)

22
23

THE COURT:

Any challenge for cause for Mr.

Cole?

24

MR. SHEPHERD:

25

THE COURT:

State will pass for cause.

What say the defendant with regard
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to the challenge for cause?
I
I

MS. BERGESON:
f o r cause.

Your Honor, we would challenge

I think that this juror —

Mr. Cole made a

A

few statements, I think, that indicate that he is likely

*I

to impose the death penalty without any regard to

fI

mitigation in the circumstance where an intentional and

71

as he described it malicious homicide has occurred.

$\

once he was able to conclude that, that he wouldn't be in

91

a position to —

And

of being able to weigh any mitigation.

10

I think that's an expression clearly that he couldn't

11

follow the law, even though he didn't say that.

12

that he would be unable to do that.

I think

13

In addition, he's expressed some feelings about

14

atonement, some religious grounding for that, and clearly

15

a feeling that continues in his life that an individual

16

who has killed needs to atone for the person's — t h e

17

victim's death.

18

that that personal bias, that apparently very deeply felt

19

personal feeling would weigh into this process.

20

things taken in combination, I think indicate that he

21

would not be able to consider his duty —

22

under the law.

23

And I think that that's an indication

THE COURT:

Those

do his duty

The defendant's objection to —

the

24J

defendant's challenge for cause to juror number four, Mr.

25

Cole, is overruled.

Mr. Cole is an acceptible juror.

Page 106
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

ADDENDUM B

Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
FORMAL REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY PURSUANT
TO RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
-vRALPH LEROY MENZIES,

Case No.

860011545

Defendant
COMES NOW the Defendant,
by and through

his

attorney,

RALPH MENZIES
NANCY' BERGESON

and requests the following material be provided to him/her as
discovery no later than three days prior to preliminary hearing
now set for the
1.

17th

day of March

, 19 86

To wit:

All police reports and investigations concerning

the above-entitled case;
2.

All written or recorded statements of the defendant

and co-defendant(s), if any;
3.

The criminal record of the defendant or felony

convictions of any witnesses to be called by the prosecution;
4.

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

5.

All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of the

defendant;

defendant?

0000;

6-

All evidence tending to mitigate tne degree 01

we

offense for reduced punishment;
7.

All physical evidence taken and all investigative

analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case;
as provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-(5)(b), the State shall
make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead.
DATED this

5th day of

March

, IS 86

m

Respectfully submitted,

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the
Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this

5t;h

day of March

, 19 86 -

CQGG£S

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake Countv. U>"h

FEB
BROOKE C. WELLS, #3421
and FRANCES M. PALACIOS, #2502
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

2 1988

AjijL 3ro Dist Court
H. Dixon HindlW^

By

- ° ^ -" *

Deoaty ClefK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

MOTION TO REQUIRE THE
STATE OF UTAH TO DISCLOSE
POTENTIAL PENALTY PHASE
WITNESSES

vs.
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

Case No. CR86-887
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant.

Defendant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, by and through his
counsel of record, BROOKE C. WELLS and FRANCES M. PALACIOS,
hereby moves this Court for an Order requiring the State of
Utah to disclose all witnesses the State intends to call should
a penalty phase in this case be required.

This written motion

supplements the oral motion made by Defendant during a hearing
held January 22, 1988.

Defendant argues that such information

is crucial to his defense of the charge of Capital Murder
pending against him and is required pursuant to the previously
filed Motion to Discover and Subsequent Order of this Court

granting such Discovery.

Although the State has provided

defendant a witness list, it does not include potential penalty
phase witnesses.
DATED this

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant

day of February, 1988.

FRANCES H., ^ALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this

day of February, 1988.

DELIVERED BY

FEB 0 21988
T. J. WENNERGREN

- 2 -

"fl ft •;• „

h : Vf: «N CLERK'S OFFICE
S^.ii Lake County Utah

BROOKE C. WELLS (#3421*) ~ "*"'
FRANCES M. PALACIOS (#2502)
Attorneys for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Otah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

JAN 5 1988

ty Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
TO DISCOVER

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

Case No, CR86-887
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant

The defendant, by and through his attorneys of record,
BROOKE C. WELLS and FRANCES M. PALACIOS, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-16 (1953 as amended) and the Due Process clauses of the
Constitutions of Utah and the United States, request that the State
of Utah disclose the following information which is in existence
within either the state or federal court systems.

Specifically,

defendant request disclosure of all psychological, psychiatric or
physical evaluations or any other assessments, including presentence
reports,which have been completed on Walbpr Britton.
DATED this

o

day of January, 1988.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant

FRANCES M. P A L A C I O S T
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this

day of January, 1988.

DELIVERED BY

JAN 6 - 1988
D. LOYOLA

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ERNIE JONES
RICHARD G. MACDOUGALL
Deputy County Attorneys
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

H L i r '.U CLERKS OFFICE
C-!: l:.:.a County (jtsft

FzJ 3 198B
2 Q n ' . • : ' : / Cbrk \d Dist Court
Sy

^

Oepuiy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

POTENTIAL WITNESSES FOR
THE STATE DURING THE
PENALTY PHASE

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR 86-887

v.
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Defendant.
Comes now the State of Utah by and through its attorneys,
Ernie Jones and Richard G. MacDougall and provides the defense with
the following

witnesses

which may be called

during

phase of the trial.
Vi Lealeifalea, 5703 Cherry Avenue Apt. E4
Long Beach, CA 90805
Carl McBrayer, 5254 Sunglow Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84118
Beverly Tischer, Utah State Prison - Records
PO Box 250, Draper, UT 84020
Ed Colbert, Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office - ID
Charles Illsley, Metro Narcotics
Byron Stark, Clerk of the Third District Court
250 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111

the penalty

Potential Witnesses for
the State During the
Penalty Phase
CR 86-887
Page 2
Myrna Schultz, Clerk, of J.P. Court
2001 South State Rm S4200, Salt Lake City, UT
84190-1500
David E. Yocom, Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 South State Rm S3400, Salt Lake City, UT
84190-1200
Greg Bown, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
231 East 400 South Fourth Floor, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111
DATED this 5

day of February, 1988.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

7
£RNTE J O N E 3 — r
Deputy County/Attorney

M^^tS^

^

JDOUGALL
Deputy County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 3rA
I

mailed

Witnesses

a
for

true
the

and

correct

State

copy

during

the

of

day of February, 1988,

the

foregoing

Penalty

Phase

to

Potential
Frances

Potential Witnesses for
the State During the
Penalty Phase
CR 86-887
Page 3
Palacios and Brooke Wells, Attorneys for Defendant, at the address
stated below.

tary3
Secretary
FRANCES PALACIOS
BROOKE WELLS
Attorneys for the Defendant
Legal Defender Association
333 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

ADDENDUM C

1

BEARABLE AND BEING DECENT THROUGH ALL THIS.

2

I WANT TO THANK MY SISTER AND FAMILY FOR

3

ALL THE LOVE AND SUPPORT THEY HAVE SHOWN ME FOR THIS.

4

WANT TO THANK MY ATTORNEYS AND FRIENDS, FRANCES AND

5

BROOKE AND KATHY, INVESTIGATOR, KEITH, BETH, KARL, AND

6

JOHN FOR ALL THE WORK AND SUPPORT THEY GAVE.

7

I

I ALSO WANT TO THANK DR. DECARIA FOR HIS

8

EFFORTS IN THIS.

9

SID AND GILBEY FOR STANDING BY ME, FOR BEING MY FRIENDS.

10

I THANK MR. MAC DOUGALL AND MR. BERGAN FOR

I WANT TO THANK MY FRIENDS, ROBIN, KIM,

11

THEIR WORK ON THIS CASE.

12

THANK THEM FOR DOING THEIR JOB.

13

HAVE TRIED THIS SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT THEIR HARD WORK ON

14

THE CASE.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

IS THERE ANY LEGAL

REASON SENTENCE SHALL NOT BE PRONOUNCED AT THIS TIME?

19
20

THANK

YOU.

17
18

THE STATE COULD NEVER

UH, I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE TO SAY.

15
16

EVEN THOUGH I'M INNOCENT, I

MS. WELLS:

I KNOW OF NO LEGAL REASON, YOUR

THE COURT:

THIS IS SOMEWHAT LENGTHY, SO

HONOR.

21
22

YOU MAY BE SEATED THERE INSTEAD OF HAVING THE DEFENDANT

23

STAND.

24
25

BUT AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, THERE WAS A
GREAT DEAL OF TESTIMONY, AND BOTH THE ATTORNEYS FOR THE
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1

STATE AND THE DEFENDANT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB.

THEY

2

WERE VERY THOROUGH, EFFICIENT, METICULOUS, AND THE COURT

3

TRIED ITS VERY BEST TO GO OVER ALL THE MATERIAL THAT WAS

4 I PRESENTED TO THE COURT.
AND I FOUND THAT THE PRISON RECORDS
APPARENTLY WERE NOT FILED IN THEIR ORDER.

SO AS I WENT

THROUGH IT, THE NOTES THAT I TOOK ARE NOT IN
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, AND THAT IS ESSENTIALLY HOW THEY
WILL BE PRESENTED, NOT IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.
BUT I WILL GO OVER THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES FIRST, AND THEN THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND INTERSPERSED IN THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE AS
I MENTIONED, THE NOTES WERE NOT IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.
AND SOME OF THE NOTES THAT I TOOK, I DID
NOT PLACE IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, AND I DID NOT HAVE A
CHANCE TO PLACE IT BACK IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER BECAUSE I
TOOK IT ALL BY LONGHAND.
IN STARTING WITH THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES, I WILL START WITH THE NATURE OF THE CRIME.
ONE, UNDER 76-5-202(D), "THE HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED WHILE
THE ACTOR WAS ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF, ATTEMPT TO
COMMIT OR FLIGHT AFTER COMMITTING OR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT
AN AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING."
TWO, UNDER 76-5-202(7)(F), "THE HOMICIDE
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1 WAS COMMITTED FOR PECUNIARY OR OTHER PERSONAL GAIN."
THREE, 76-5-202(H), "THE ACTOR WAS

2

3 CONVICTED OF A FELONY INVOLVING THE USE OF THREAT OR
4 VIOLENCE TO A PERSON."
FOUR, 75-5-202(1)(I), "THE HOMICIDE WAS

5

6 COMMITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING A WITNESS FROM
7 TESTIFYING.
FIVE, 76-2-2(Q), "THE HOMICIDE" —

8

OR THAT

9 MIGHT BE (G). NO, THAT MIGHT BE (Q), "THE HOMICIDE WAS
10 COMMITTED IN AN ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, CRUEL
11 MANNER DEMONSTRATED BY SERIOUS BODILY INJURY TO THE
12 VICTIM BEFORE DEATH."
THEN PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY,

13

14 76-3-207(2)(A), ONE, THERE WAS AN EXTENSIVE JUVENILE
15 COURT RECORD FROM 4-13-66, AT THE AGE OF SEVEN WHEN HE
16 WAS INITIALLY REFERRED ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE HE NEEDED TO
17 HAVE A PLACE TO STAY, UP UNTIL APPROXIMATELY DECEMBER 1ST
18 I OF 1975, AND IT MAY BE SOMETIME IN 1976.

IN BETWEEN THAT

19 TIME, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 3 8 REFERRALS MADE.
20

TWO, AND SOMETIME IN 1976, HE WAS CERTIFIED

21 TO THE DISTRICT COURT.
22

THREE, THERE WAS EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL RECORD.

23

WHILE

IN E L Y , NEVADA,

HE WAS

C O M M I T T E D TO T H E

NEVADA

24

YOUTH TRAINING CENTER, RELEASED DECEMBER '74 ON PAROLE.

25

THE PAROLE WAS REVOKED, AND HE WAS RETURNED TO THE NEVADA

3250

YOUTH TRAINING CENTER APPROXIMATELY MARCH OF 1975.

p
»

FOUR, THAT THE NEVADA YOUTH TRAINING CENTER
WAS UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH RALPH; THUS, HE WAS

'4 TRANSFERRED TO THE CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY.
5

FIVE, HE WENT AWOL FROM THE SHELTER IN

6 NOVEMBER OF 1975 WHILE WAITING A CERTIFICATION
7

HEARING,

AND THAT WAS DISMISSED, HOWEVER.
SIX, HE WAS SENT TO THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL

9

WARD 56 FOR A 3 0-DAY EVALUATION.

HE WAS RETURNED TO

JO

DETENTION WITHIN A WEEK BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT WORK WITH

11

HIM WHEN HE WAS INVOLVED IN AN AWOL PLOT.

12

SEVEN, JANUARY 6TH, 197 6, HE WAS COMMITTED

13

TO THE STATE INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL, HELD IN THE DETENTION

14

CENTER PENDING A MOTION TO CERTIFY IN 1976.

15

EIGHT, ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1976, HE WAS

16

CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, SENTENCED FIVE TO LIFE

17

FOR THE ROBBERY OF THE 7-11 STORE, AND THERE WERE TWO

18

ROBBERIES INVOLVED IN THAT; ONE WAS DECEMBER 21ST, 1975,

19

AND THE OTHER DECEMBER 26, 1976, APPROXIMATELY A WEEK A

20

PART, SAME STORE.

21

NINE, JULY 11, 1978, HE ESCAPES FROM

22

OFFICIAL CUSTODY, AND HE WAS CONVICTED OF THAT, SENTENCED

23

ONE TO FIFTEEN YEARS.

24
25

TEN, FEBRUARY 5TH, 1979, HE WAS CONVICTED
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, SENTENCED FIVE TO LIFE.

THIS IS
3251

1 THE INSTANCE IN WHICH THE CAB DRIVER HAD HIS ARM
2 MUTILATED BECAUSE OF A DISCHARGE OF THE WEAPON THAT WAS
3

CARRIED.

4

TWELVE, FEBRUARY 6 OF 1986, I'M NOT SURE OF

5

THIS PARTICULAR DATE, BUT AROUND FEBRUARY OF 1986, HE WAS

6

CONVICTED OF THEFT WHICH WAS A MISDEMEANOR, AND THEN

7

FEBRUARY, AGAIN, 1986, CONVICTED OF THEFT AND ANOTHER

8

MISDEMEANOR.

9

SENTENCED ON MARCH 11, 1986, DURING WHICH TIME THE MURDER

10

HE WAS RELEASED ON A PRETRIAL MOTION TO BE

OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER OCCURRED ON FEBRUARY 24, 1986.
THIRTEEN, FROM THE TIME THE DEFENDANT WAS

11
12

APPROXIMATELY SEVEN YEARS OLD TO THE PRESENT TIME, HE HAS

13

BEEN IN SHELTER HOMES, YOUTH DETENTION FACILITIES, JAILS

14

OR IN THE CUSTODY OF THE UTAH STATE PRISON WITH BRIEF

15

INTERMITTENT PERIODS OF NONCUSTODIAL LIVING.
CHARACTER, BACKGROUND, HISTORY, MENTAL

16
17

CONDITION:

18

BEHAVIOR BE CHANGED?

19

PROGRAMS, POSSIBLY.

20

PRISON DOES NOT HAVE IT.

21

CHECK PROGRAMS THAT WERE AVAILABLE.

22

HOSPITAL PREVIOUSLY TURNED HIM DOWN BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT

23

COOPERATE.

24
25

THE QUESTION IS, CAN HIS ATTITUDE AND
IF THERE ARE THE RIGHT KIND OF
SOME OF THE ANALYSIS, THE UTAH STATE
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT BOTHER TO
THE UTAH STATE

THEY HAD PROBLEMS WITH HIM.
DR. DECARIA SAYS IS HE HAS THE RIGHT

THERAPISTS WITH THE RIGHT SKILLS, THEY CAN TREAT HIM.
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1 THE UTAH STATE PRISON DOES NOT HAVE ONE THAT CAN DO THAT.
THE DEFENDANT MUST HAVE THE DESIRE TO

2
3 CHANGE.

DR. DECARIA STATED THE DEFENDANT NEVER TOLD HIM

4 HE WOULD; HOWEVER, IN INTERVIEWS HE OTHERWISE FELT HE WAS
5 AMENABLE.
6

HE IS A THREAT TO SOCIETY.

THE DEFENDANT

7

WILL GET EVEN WITH THE S.O.B. WHO PUT HIM IN JAIL AND
OTHERS AT OTHER TIMES.
THE PAROLE REPORT INDICATES HE WAS A
CHANGED MAN FOR THE BETTER, MUCH IMPROVEMENT.

HOWEVER,

13 MONTHS AFTER PAROLE, HE COMMITTED THEFTS; 18 MONTHS
AFTER, HOMICIDE.
DR. PATRICIA SMITH HAS QUESTIONED
DR. DECARIA'S METHODS, NO PROJECTIVE TESTS.

SHE FELT

THIS WAS NECESSARY.
OTHER EVALUATIONS FROM PSYCHIATRIC SOCIAL
WORKERS OR PH.D. OR MASTER PSYCHOLOGISTS AND
PSYCHIATRISTS —

ALL WHO HAVE REACHED THEIR OWN TESTING

METHODS OR USED THEIR OWN TESTING METHODS.
ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE, AND THIS WAS IN THE
P.S.I. REPORT TO JUDGE LEARY BY FLINT J. MOLNER:

HE

CONSUMED BEER OR BRANDY ANYTIME FINANCES COULD AFFORD.
DRUGS BY INJECTION OR INTRAVENOUS USE:
HEROIN, SPEED, ACID, MESCALINE; COCAINE, T.H.C., ANY
OTHER NARCOTIC DRUG HE CAN GET HIS HANDS ON.
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HE HAS DONE ODD JOBS AS A MECHANIC; HAS NO

1

2 FORMAL JOB OF ANY TYPE.

SUPPORTS HIMSELF THROUGH

3 CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
NICOLE ARNOLD IN 198 6 SMUGGLED A

4

5 SCREWDRIVER INTO THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL.

IN A SHAKEDOWN

6 OF THE CELL, THERE WAS A DUSTPAN HANDLE MADE INTO A SHARP
7

INSTRUMENT.
THE JAILERS TESTIFIED OF THE DIFFICULTY HE

8

9 SAID HE COULD CAUSE JAILERS AND OTHER INMATES.
10
11

AND JULY 22, 1978, HE WAS ARRESTED WITH A
FALSE I.D.

12

YOUTH:

AT THE PRESENT TIME, HE IS NEITHER

13

A CHILD NOR A TEENAGER.

14

IMPAIRED BY SOME DEFICITS, BUT CAPABLE OF ANSWERING TO

15

THESE CHARGES AND ANY PENALTY.

16

HE IS AN ADULT.

HE MAY BE

ANY OTHER FACTORS, 76-3-207(9).

AGAIN, THE

17

DEFENDANT HAS SCARRED THE LIVES OF TOO MANY PEOPLE,

18

MAUREEN HUNSAKER, HER FAMILY, AND PARENTS.

19

MC BRAYER, VALFOA SAUNIEA LEALAITAFEA.

20

CARL W.

LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS NO GUARANTEE.

THE

21

BOARD OF PARDONS MAY RELEASE OR PAROLE IN SPITE OF

22

RECOMMENDATIONS.

23

YEARS.

24

SIX YEARS.

25

HE MAY ESCAPE.

AVERAGE COMMITMENT 2 0

DEFENDANT IN FOR TWO FIVE-TO-LIFE•S AND OUT IN

HE HAS HAD POOR MOTHERING, POOR CHILDHOOD,
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1 AND IN THIS INSTANCE, THE VICTIM —
2

HIS ACTIVITIES WERE

COLD AND CALCULATED.

3

ELEVEN TO TWELVE HOURS FEAR AND ANXIETY TO

4

BE FREE AS PROMISED.

5

HANDCUFFED, DOESN'T KNOW WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.

6

LIGATURE, ONE SCREAM.

7

WATCHES HIS VICTIM DIE, REMOVED HANDCUFFS, AND WALKED

8

AWAY.

9

ELEVEN TO TWELVE HOURS WAITING,

NO HELP.

THROAT CUT.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT CHANGED FOR OTHER JUDGES.

10

THE DEFENDANT'S LETTER WAS UNSOLICITED.

11

MANIPULATE.

12

COURTS.

13

ATTEMPTED TO

HISTORY SHOWS NO RESPECT FOR THIS OR OTHER

PROPORTIONALITY:

14

CONSIDERATION.

15

NOT A CONSIDERATION.

16

DEFENDANT

TILLMAN CASE IS NOT A

COSTS, STATE V. NORMAN CASE STILL SAYS

THEN, IN THE P.S.R., FLINT MOLNER:

THE

17

COURT EXTRACTED SOME INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY RELATING

18

TO TESTS THAT WERE GIVEN TO HIM.

19

JUVENILE COURT, THE FIRST REFERRAL WAS MAY 4TH OF 19 68

20

BECAUSE OF LACK OF CARE.

21

THEY INDICATED THAT THE

IT WAS PARENTS FAULT.

THE REPORT INDICATES FIRST STEP-PARENT WAS

22

1964, FRANCIS CLIFFORD PORTER, MEMBER OF A MOTORCYCLE

23

GANG; DIVORCED 1967.

24

CLINTON STEVENS.

25

1968, SECOND STEP-FATHER, OLIVER

MOTHER DIED IN 1972 OF LEUKEMIA.

THESE REPORTS ALL INDICATED THAT THE FIRST
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1

STEP-FATHER WAS VERY CRUEL AND BEAT HIM AND WAS VERY

2

DEMANDING, UNLOVING.

3

STRICT, ALSO BEAT HIM, AND THE DEFENDANT HAD EXTREME

4

DIFFICULTY WITH BOTH STEP-FATHERS.

5

THE SECOND STEP-FATHER WAS VERY

HE MARRIED MARIA THAYER AUGUST 18, 197 6,

6

AND I WAS NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WAS EITHER

7

DIVORCED OR THE MARRIAGE WAS ANNULLED APPROXIMATELY

8

APRIL 5 OF 19- —

9

APRIL 5 OF 1977.

10

WELL, COULDN'T BE RIGHT.

JUVENILE COURT WAS UNABLE TO CURB OR

11

REHABILITATE HIM.

12

INTELLECTUAL ABILITY.

13

HIGHLY MANIPULATIVE.

14

POSSIBLY,

HE IS WELL ABOVE AVERAGE IN
CONSIDERS HIS OWN NEEDS AND IS

DRUGS AND ALCOHOL ARE PROBLEMS.

15

HAS POTENTIAL FOR DANGER FOR SOCIETY.

16

LONG-TERM TREATMENT IN STRUCTURED SETTING.

DEFINITELY

EXTENSIVE

17

DR. TROY GILL, MARCH 1ST, '76:

18

PERSONALITY, PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE PERSONALITY.

19

OF IMPULSIVITY, IRRESPONSIBILITY, AND IMMATURE AND

20

DEMANDING BEHAVIOR.

21

HYGIENE CENTER:

23

DISORDER, DEVIANT.

25

HIGH RATE

LEWIS L. BOONE, MURRAY JORDAN MENTAL

22

24

ANTISOCIAL

PSYCHOPATHIC, DEFINITE CHARACTER
THIS IS FEBRUARY 2 6 OF 1976,

PUBLIC OFFENDER'S PROGRAM, UTAH STATE
HOSPITAL DECEMBER 3RD, 1975:

PROGNOSIS, VERY POOR.
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j [NEVADA YOUTH TRAINING FACILITY, MANY

i-Kuo^^.

2

STATE HOSPITAL, DECEMBER 3RD, 1975, ADMITTED; DECEMBER

3

10, 1975, SEPARATION.

HE WAS REFERRED BY JUDGE LARSEN OF

4 THE JUVENILE COURT.
5

JOHN WOODS, M.D., UNIT DIRECTOR, FORENSIC

6

PSYCHIATRY:

7

DIAGNOSIS, PERSONALITY DISORDER, ANTISOCIAL; TYPE,

8

SEVERE.

9

A SERIOUS AWOL PLOT, DECEMBER 7, 1976, DANGEROUS PATIENT,

10 ESCAPED.

PROGNOSIS, POOR.

FINAL PSYCHIATRIC

AND THIS WAS THE INCIDENT IN WHICH HE HELPED IN

THOUGHT SERIOUS TO ESCAPE FROM THE UTAH STATE

11 HOSPITAL, WILL ESCAPE FROM ANY INSTITUTION.
12

MARCH 15, '73, 14 YEARS OLD, PSYCHOLOGICAL

13

EVALUATION, SPENCER L. WOODS, M.S., PSYCHOLOGIST:

14

AGGRESSIVE, INCIDENTS INVOLVING KNIVES.

15

THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST, M.M.P.I., AND SENTENCE

16

COMPLETION.

17

HE WAS GIVEN

DULL NORMAL INTELLIGENCE ABILITY, ACADEMIC

18

DEFICIT IN ALL AREAS; IMPULSIVITY, DISTRACTIBILITY,

19

HYPERACTIVITY.

20

DIFFICULTIES.

21

SOCIOPATHIC MOMENTS.

22

VERIFIED PRESENCE OF ORGANIC
NO EVIDENCE OF PSYCHOSIS, HYPOMANIC AND
POOR JUDGMENT.

MURRAY-JORDAN-TOOELE MENTAL HEALTH OR

23

HYGIENE CENTER.

LEWIS L. BOONE, M.S.W., PSYCHIATRIC

24

SOCIAL WORKERS INTERVIEWS 2-18-76, 2-24-76, 2-26-76, AND

25

THIS, I BELIEVE, IS THE ONE IN WHICH HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY
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1 JUDGE LARSEN NOT TO READ OR LOOK AT ANY OTHER PSYCHIATRIC
2 OR PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS OR ANYTHING WRITTEN ABOUT HIM,
3 AND HIS ANALYSIS IS PARANOIA, EXTREME RESISTANCE TO
4

INFLUENCE, IMPULSIVITY, AND ASOCIAL SOCIOPATHIC DEFICIT

5

CHARACTER DISORDER DIAGNOSIS.

6

BE RELEASED TO EITHER THE ODESSY HOUSE OR WARD 56 OF THE

AND HE RECOMMENDED THAT HE

7 UTAH STATE HOSPITAL.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 9-16-76, A. L.

8
9

CARLISLE, PH.D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST BIPOLAR

10

PSYCHOLOGICAL INVENTORY, DESCRIPTIVE WORD INVENTORY,

11

SHIPLEY INSTITUTE, THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST, AND

12

SENTENCE COMPLETION TEST.

13

INTELLIGENCE.

14

UPPER LEVEL, MOST AREAS.

15

11TH, 12TH GRADE READING, 10TH GRADE OVERALL.

16

CAPABILITIES TO SUCCEED IN MANY DIFFERENT AREAS.

SHIPLEY I.Q., NORMAL

G.A.T.B., GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY,
EDUCATION PERFORMANCE, 10TH,
NECESSARY

PERSONALITY TESTING, ANXIETY, DEPRESSION,

17
18

SOME WITHDRAWAL, SOCIAL DEVIANCY, IMPULSIVENESS AND

19

HOSTILITY.

20

BEHAVIOR AND OTHERS' IMPRESSIONS.

21

VIOLENT POTENTIAL CONSISTENT WITH PAST

LOW TOLERANCE FOR FRUSTRATION; RELATIVELY

22

LONELY; SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM WITH DRUGS.

23

NEEDS HELP, IN DEPTH THERAPY NECESSARY.

24
25

FUTURE HOPELESS,

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, JULY 20, 1979,
A. L. CARLISLE, PH.D., PSYCHOLOGIST:

ASSESSMENT, RESULT
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IN NORMAL INTELLIGENCE, VOCABULARY; I.Q. 106 ABSTRACT;
I.Q. 95; TOTAL, 102.

HE IS A PRIVATE PERSON, DISTANCES

HIMSELF FROM OTHERS; CONTROLS THINGS THAT HAPPEN TO HIM.
ATTEMPT TO CONTROL BEHAVIOR, HAS SHOWN IMPROVEMENT IN
PAST YEAR.

LESS IMPULSIVE, WILLING TO HELP OUT IN WORK,

QUITE A FEW POSITIVE C NOTES.
UNDERLYING ANGER, IF HE ACTS OUT IN FUTURE,
MORE CHOICE THAN IMPULSE.

WHEN HE GETS OUT, HE'LL EITHER

STAY OUT OF TROUBLE OR MORE PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CRIMINAL
HISTORY BECOME MORE SKILLED CRIMINAL.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, 9-4-80, A. L.
CARLISLE, PH.D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST:

STRONG

ANTISOCIAL BACKGROUND, HABITUAL PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR.
TRYING TO CHANGE; SINCERE IN DOING SO.
IMPROVEMENT.

SHOWN DEFINITE

PROGNOSIS MUCH BETTER THAN INITIALLY.

RALPH IS RALPH.

DOES JOB, COOPERATIVE, RESPECTFUL UNLESS

HE IS PUSHED.
BOARD OF PARDONS PROGRESS NOTE OR REPORT
JULY 9, 1984, LADDY PRUETT, S.S.W.; COLLEEN LINDLEY,
S.S.W.

RALPH NOT AFRAID OF WORK, GOOD WORKER.

COMMUNICATION WITH WORKER.

OPEN

COUNSELING ON WEEKLY BASIS.

MAKING HONEST EFFORT TO RETURN TO SOCIETY.
GRANDFATHER HAVE OFFERED A PLACE TO STAY.

SISTER AND
GOOD

RELATIONSHIP WITH KUBOTA'S.
REPORT PERIOD, NOVEMBER 12, '80 TO JUNE 9,
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1

'81:

PROGRAM HAS SOME WORK TO DO, BUT HAS MATURED

2

CONSIDERABLY DURING YEARS IN PRISON.
VOCATION, EMPLOYMENT:

3

REGULAR WORK REPORTS

4

AND COMMENTS EXCELLENT, VERY CAPABLE WORKER.

5

HOURS THAN AVERAGE.
SOCIAL, PAM SOMMERALL:

6
7

ESTRANGED FROM FAMILY.

8
9
10

WORKS MORE

FOSTER SISTER

NEGATIVE IMPACT ANYWAY.

DISCIPLINARY, NO WRITE-UPS.
APPROPRIATE, DRASTIC CHANGE BLOCKS.

BEHAVIOR

STAFF SAYS

COOPERATIVE.

11

CARLA HENNINGER, P.S.W. S.S.W; RICHARD

12

BURTON, SUPERVISING SOCIAL SERVICE WORKER:

13

VISITS BY ANY OF HIS FAMILY, SISTER, JACKIE; AUNT KUBOTA;

14

OR

NEVER ANY

GRANDFATHER.

15

CHRONOLOGICAL NOTES 9-15-76 TO 10-15-84:

16

WHEN HE WAS GIVEN WORK ASSIGNMENTS, HE HAS GOOD TO

17

EXCELLENT ACTS.

18

WITHOUT PAY.

19

RECOMMENDATIONS.

20

IN ADDITION, PUTS IN ADDITIONAL TIME

VOLUNTEERS TO DO WORK.

WRITE-UPS PERIODIC.

GIVEN GOOD

STRONG-ARM TACTICS,

21

THREATS TO INMATES AND GUARDS WHEN PUSHED, POSSIBLY

22

HOSTILE, THREATENING, ABUSIVE, IMPULSIVE.
FINISHED HIS G.E.D., HELPED OTHERS,

23
24

INMATES.

COMMUNICATES

25

LEADERSHIP ROLE.

BETWEEN INMATE AND STAFF.

ASSUMED

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE.
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FEBRUARY 9, «73, INITIAL EVALUATION BY
PEGGY ELLIS, A.C.S.W., PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIAL WORKER.
IMPRESSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION:

SEVERELY DISTURBED BOY

AND NATURE OF HIS DISTURBANCE IS SUCH THAT HE DEFINITELY
HAS POTENTIAL FOR DANGER TO SOCIETY.

WITHOUT

INTERVENTION, THIS IS A BOY WHO WILL LIKELY BE AT
CONTINUAL ODDS WITH SOCIETY.
THE PROGNOSIS IS NOT THE BEST AND SUCCESS
OF REHABILITATION WOULD PROBABLY COME ABOUT ONLY AS A
RESULT OF EXTENSIVE LONG-TERM TREATMENT IN A STRUCTURED
SETTING.

EVEN SO, THE RISK OF NOT PROVIDING TREATMENT

OPPORTUNITY TO THIS BOY IS TOO GREAT TO IGNORE.
TREATMENT WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY HIS FEAR
OF CONFINEMENT AND APPARENT LOW TOLERANCE FOR STRUCTURED
SITUATIONS.

PSYCHO-THERAPY WOULD BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF

HIS POOR ABILITY WITH RELATIONSHIPS AND LITTLE INSIGHT OR
CONCERN WITH HIS PROBLEMS.

MOTIVATION TO CHANGE IS

NEGATIVE.
IN HIS FAVOR WOULD BE HIS AGE, THE FACT, IF
WE ACCEPT REPORTS FROM STATE HOSPITAL, SOME OF THE MORE
SEVERE DISTURBANCES ARE OF A FAIRLY RECENT ONSET, AND HE
HAS MADE ADEQUATE ADJUSTMENT WHILE IN DETENTION.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION, 2-9-76, ROBERT
STRAUN, PH.D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST.
M.M.P.I.

HE WAS GIVEN THE

IT SHOWS IMMATURE, IMPULSIVE EMOTIONALLY
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1 UNSTABLE, UNRESPONSIBLE.
TWO, ALCOHOL ABUSE AND AGGRESSION CAN

2
3

OCCUR.

THREE, CONTROL OF ANGER POOR.

SENSITIVE TO

4

REJECTION OR FRUSTRATION OF EGOCENTRIC DEMANDS FOR

5

ATTENTION FOR APPROVAL.

FIVE, JUDGMENT MAY BE

6 UNDEFENDABLE UNDER STRESS.
SIX, DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING EMOTIONAL

7
8

EQUILIBRIUM AND INDEPENDENCE UNDER STRESS.

9

FRUSTRATION CAN BE REACTED TO WITH IRRITABILITY AND

10

DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR.
RORSCHACH:

11

ONE, ADEQUATE CONTACT WITH

12

REALITY.

13

APPERCEPTION TEST:

14

TWO, SEXUAL ADJUSTMENTS.

TWO, NO SERIOUS THINKING DISORDER.

16

GIRLFRIENDS.

17

RELATIONSHIPS.

19
20

THEMATIC

ONE, DIFFICULTY MASTERING TASKS.

SENTENCE COMPLETION:

15

18

SEVEN,

STRONG-FELT NEEDS FOR

TWO, AMBIVALENCE IN HETEROSEXUAL
MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH HOMOSEXUAL PANIC.

SUMMARY:

ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR ASSOCIATED

WITH SEVERE SOCIAL AND VOCATIONAL MALADJUSTMENTS.
IN PSYCHIATRIC EXAM, MARCH 1ST, '76, TROY

21

GILL, M.D., PSYCHIATRIST:

22

REHABILITATION IS POOR.

23

RECOMMENDATIONS WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY AS TO

24

SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

25

PROGNOSIS FOR TOTAL
DIFFICULT TO MAKE TREATMENT

THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIC
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EVALUATION, MARCH 7, '73.
GOOD.

PROGNOSIS SHOULD BE FAIRLY

FINAL PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS, ORGANIC BRAIN

SYNDROME WITHOUT PSYCHOSIS, UNDIFFERENTIATED

(MINIMAL

BRAIN DYSFUNCTION) SYNDROME BEHAVIOR DISORDER.
ADOLESCENT WITH UNSOCIALIZED FEATURES.

CONDITION OF

PATIENT ON DISCHARGE, IMPROVED.
ANOTHER PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AT THE UTAH
STATE HOSPITAL IN WHICH HE WAS REFERRED FOR PULLING A
KNIFE AND INFLICTING INJURY TO GIRL WHO TEASED HIM AND
INDICATED HE WOULD "CUT HER GUTS OUT."
PHILLIP WASHBURN, M.D., PSYCHIATRIST,
CHILDREN'S WARD.

FINAL PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS:

ADJUSTMENT REACTION OF EARLY ADOLESCENCE WITH DEVELOPING
PERSONALITY PATTERN DISTURBANCE, ANTISOCIAL FEATURES.
JUNE 3, 1970, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION,
PEUANDRA BHAGAY, M.A., D.M., S.B., PSYCHOLOGIST.
NORMAL RANGE OF INTELLIGENCE.
LEVEL.

AVERAGE

PERFORMANCE I.Q., BRIGHT

NOT AGGRESSIVE, IMMATURE, EXHIBITIONIST.

FAIRLY

GOOD JUDGMENT OF SOCIAL SITUATIONS.
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION,
JOHN C. WOOD, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST, DECEMBER 15, '77:
THERE WAS A SERIOUS AWOL PLOT ON DECEMBER 7, »77, CREATED
DIVERSIONARY TACTIC HELPING DANGEROUS PATIENT TO ESCAPE.
EASIER TO BREAK OUT OF UTAH STATE HOSPITAL.
ALTHOUGH UTAH STATE HOSPITAL PROGRAM GOOD
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FOR HIM, DEFENDANT NOT READY TO PARTICIPATE.
LITTLE CAUTIOUS.

FAMILY A

THREATENED SISTER WITH KNIFE.

FIGHTS WITH SISTER.

PLACED FINALLY IN DETENTION.

LITTLE INDICATION TOWARD CHANGE.
WANTS THE EASIEST WAY.
DIAGNOSIS:
SEVERE.

SEVERE

PROGNOSIS:

GETS WHAT

VERY POOR.

PERSONALITY DISORDER, ANTISOCIAL; TYPE,

RETURNED TO JUVENILE COURT.
AND THEN GETTING TO THE MITIGATING, AND I

INDICATED SOME OF THIS WOULD BE MIXED.

THERE ARE

MITIGATING FACTORS, ALSO, IN THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT I READ.
ONE, 76-3-202, AS INDICATED BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL, HE WAS UNSTABLE.

INTERVENING PERIODS WITHOUT

RESTRAINT AS FAR AS THE VICTIM WAS CONCERNED.
OCCURRED QUICKLY WITHOUT TORTURE.

DEATH

CIRCUMSTANTIAL NATURE

OF THE EVIDENCE OF FELONIES, AND, OF COURSE, THE ONLY
WITNESS IS NOW DECEASED.
OCCURRED WHILE DEFENDANT WAS SUFFERING FROM
ONE, SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER; TWO, BORDERLINE
PERSONALITY DISORDER; THREE, ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY
DISORDER.

ALL D.M.S-IIIR AND ALSO DYSFUNCTION.
76-3-207(2)(B).

THE MURDER WAS COMMITTED

WHILE THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER EXTREME MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL
DISTURBANCE, DYSFUNCTION.
THE VICTIM WAS UNHARMED, CARL W. MC BRAYER;
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1

HOWEVER, WEAPON WAS USED BOTH TIMES.

2

SECOND TIME.

3

DITCH OR "BLOW YOUR HEAD OFF."

DROPPED OFF AT AIRPORT.

HE WAS PICKED UP —

TAKEN FOR RIDE
TOLD TO GET INTO

THE DEFENDANT WAS

PICKED UP IN NEVADA AND SHOWED NO REMORSE.
INJURY WAS UNINTENTIONAL, AND THIS IS

6
7

VALFOA SAUNIEA LAELAITAFEA.
FROM ESCAPE.

ALMOST SHOT ARM OFF WITH LOADED SHOTGUN.

THE VICTIM WAS HOSPITALIZED.

HAD MANY OPERATIONS.

REMORSE, BOASTS TO JAIL INMATE, BRITTON,

10
11

PERPETUATED WHILE AT LARGE

CUTTING HER THROAT WAS THE GREATEST THRILL OF HIS LIFE.

12

ALLEGED BAD ACTS HAVE —

13

BACKGROUND HISTORY, MENTAL CONDITION:

14

WERE UNPROVEN.

15

THIS IS CHARACTER,
ALLEGED BAD ACTS

UNDER 76-3-207(D), AT TIME OF MURDER THE

16

CAPACITY OF THE DEFENDANT TO APPRECIATE THE CRIMINALITY

17

(WRONGNESS) OF HIS CONDUCT TO THE REQUIREMENT OF LAW WAS

18

SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED AS A RESULT OF EXTREME MENTAL OR

19

EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE OR DYSFUNCTION.

20

CHILDHOOD:

ABUSE, DEATH, NO PARENTING,

21

INSTABILITY.

TWO COMMITMENTS, UTAH STATE HOSPITAL.

22

CERTIFICATION TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON AT AGE OF 17.

23

NO TREATMENT OR INTERVENTION.

24

PRISON EDUCATION PROGRESS, WORK SUCCESS, AND ACTIVITIES.

25

UTAH STATE

HISTORY OF ALCOHOL AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE:
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1

YOUTH, 27; EMOTIONAL AGE 10-12.
ANY OTHER FACTORS, 76-3-207(G):

2
3

SAFE FROM SOCIETY.

4

PARDONS.

5

PARDONS.

LIFE TERM,

RECOMMENDATION FROM COURT TO BOARD OF

RECOMMENDATION OF PROSECUTOR TO BOARD OF

AMENABILITY TO TREATMENT OR CHANGE.

6
7

AVAILABILITY OF TREATMENT SOURCES.

8

PRISON LIFE.

ABILITY TO ADAPT TO

CONTINUED FAMILY SUPPORT.
INABILITY TO EXPRESS HIS SIDE OF THE STORY.

9
10

EXERCISED RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY.

11

FANTASY, ESCAPE CONSISTENT WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS

12

INDICATED BY DR. DECARIA.

13

BLACKOUTS, AMNESIA,

LIFE OR DEATH IS THE SAME, JUST THE MANNER

14

OF DEATH.

15

DEATH PENALTY.

16

THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE IMPOSITION OF THE

MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES AND STATES IN THE

17

UNITED STATES AND FEDERAL COURTS DO NOT IMPOSE THE DEATH

18

PENALTY.

19

THE WOOD CASE, THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT

20

ONE SENTENCE IS BETTER THAN THE OTHER.

21

CATEGORY IN RUTHLESSNESS OF CRIME.

22

THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN CULPABILITY, AND THEREFORE, YOU

23

HAVE THE AGGRAVATED VERSUS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

24

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND APPROPRIATENESS BEYOND A

25

REASONABLE DOUBT.

THERE IS NO

IT IS RECOGNIZED
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1

CONCLUSIONS AND HEARSAY IN REPORTS COULD

2

NOT BE ADDRESSED.

3

MURDER BY STATE.

4

KILL."

APPROPRIATENESS:
MERCY.

IS NOT UNDEFINED.

FORGIVENESS.

"THOU SHALT NOT

CIVILIZED SOCIETY ELIMINATES THOSE DEEMED
INFERIOR.

ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF

DEATH PENALTY.
AFFIDAVITS OF ATTORNEYS.

THE

PROPORTIONALITY OF DEATH PENALTY DEPENDS ON THE
10

PROSECUTOR, THE JURISDICTION, JURY, AND THE JUDGE.
IF THERE IS DOUBT FOR ANY REASON, LIFE

11
12

IMPRISONMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN.
FOUR ISSUES OF THE DEATH PENALTY:

13

ONE,

14

PUNISHMENT CAN BE INCARCERATION.

TWO, RETRIBUTION, EYE

15

FOR AN EYE; CONSIDERATIONS OF MERCY, FORGIVENESS,

16

VINDICATE DEATH, SANITY OF THE STATE VERSUS INFIRMITY OF

17

THE DEFENDANT.

18

PENALTY VERSUS LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

THREE, REHABILITATION.

FOUR, COST; DEATH

19

DEFENDANT IS A HUMAN BEING.

20

BACK MAUREEN HUNSAKER BY TAKING HIS LIFE.

21

TO HER FAMILY.

22

DEFENDANT'S.

CANNOT BRING
SAME WITH LOSS

CANNOT PUT VALUE ON HER LIFE BY DEVALUING

RALPH L. MENZIES DID NOT CHOOSE PATH HE HAS

23
24

TAKEN.

IT IS NOT OF HIS MAKING.

25

A BETTER LIFE.

HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED

INSTEAD SUBJECT OF DEPRAVATION.

UNABLE
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1

TO CONTROL HIS BEHAVIOR.

2

TREATED.

EMOTIONAL ILLNESS CAN BE

HE LOVES HIS FAMILY AND IS LOVED BY THEM.

3
4

SUCCEEDED IN PRISON DISCIPLINE.

5

MEDIATED BETWEEN STAFF AND INMATES.

6

LOYALTY.

7

ACHIEVED ACADEMICALLY.
HAS RESPECT AND

WILL THE HUMAN HEART BE MADE HARDER OR

8

SOFTER BECAUSE OF HIS LIFE?

9

WILL WE OBSERVE THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE OR CELEBRATION

10

AS AT THE SELBY EXECUTION,

OF DEATH?

11

THE COURT HAS, TO THE BEST OF THE COURT'S

12

ABILITY, WEIGHED AND EVALUATED THE MITIGATING

13

CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

14

CONCLUSION THE COURT HAS REACHED IS THAT BASED ON THE

15

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT

16

CONCLUDES THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGH THE

17

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

18

AND THE

NOW, WE COME TO THE APPROPRIATENESS UNDER

19

THE CIRCUMSTANCE.

20

HOW MUCH WILL THE COMMUNITY TOLERATE?

21

MUST OR SHOULD THE DEFENDANT HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO

22

PRISON?

23

IN HIS OPENING, MR. JONES HAS STATED,
HOW MANY TIMES

TWO, HOW MANY TIMES MUST PEOPLE BE

24

THREATENED, PUT IN FEAR OF LIFE OR LIMB, HURT, MAIMED,

25

INJURED, OR MURDERED?

THREE, HOW MANY ESCAPES ARE TO BE
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1

TOLERATED?

2

ENTITLED TO?

FOUR, HOW MANY PAROLES WILL THE DEFENDANT BE

THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THIS
COMMUNITY HAS BEEN PUT AT TOO MUCH RISK.

THERE IS NO

GUARANTEE THE DEFENDANT WILL NOT ESCAPE AGAIN.

THERE IS

NO GUARANTEE HE WILL NOT BE PAROLED AGAIN IN ONE YEAR OR
THIRTY YEARS.
THE LONG-TERM INTENSIVE TREATMENT NECESSARY
TO REHABILITATE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE
10

UTAH STATE PRISON OR ANY OTHER INSTITUTION IN THIS STATE

11

THAT THE COURT IS AWARE OF.

12

THERE IS NO FACILITY WHERE OTHER INMATES OR

13

STAFF WILL BE FREE FROM THREATS, INTIMIDATION, OR HARM

14

FROM THE DEFENDANT.

15

GIVEN, AS IT ONCE WAS GIVEN AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON

16

UNSUCCESSFULLY, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE IT WILL BE

17

SUCCESSFUL IN THE FUTURE.

18

WILL IT DIMINISH THE DANGER TO THOSE EXPOSED TO THE

19

DEFENDANT IF HE IS TO BE "WAREHOUSED," AS THE TERM IS

20

COMMONLY USED, FOR THE REST OF HIS NATURAL LIFE AT THE

21

UTAH STATE PRISON.

22

IF ANY REHABILITATIVE TREATMENT IS

AND GIVEN SUCH OPTIONS, HOW

MY GREATEST CONCERN IS FOR THE INNOCENT

23

VICTIM, THE INNOCENT VICTIM OR THE VICTIMS IN THE FUTURE

24

AND HOW BEST TO PROTECT THEM.

25

LIFE OF DEPRIVATION OF LOVE, COMPANIONSHIP, MATERIAL

THE DEFENDANT HAS LIVED A
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NEEDS, OPPORTUNITY FOR EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, FAMILY
HOME, AND A NORMAL LIFE.
HE HAS PERFORMED WELL UNDER ADVERSE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE INCARCERATED.

YET HIS PATTERN OF

LIVING HAS CONSTANTLY AND CONTINUALLY EXPOSED MANY PEOPLE
TO FEAR AND HARM.

REGARDLESS OF WHERE HE RESIDES, IT IS

UNLIKELY THE PATTERN WILL EVER CHANGE.
CONSEQUENTLY, THIS COURT, WITH THE HEAVIEST
OF HEARTS, MAKES THE MORE DIFFICULT AND TRYING DECISION
THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT, THE DEATH PENALTY IS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY, AND
THE COURT SO ORDERS.
ANYTHING FURTHER AT THIS TIME?
MR. JONES:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

YOU NEED TO

SET A DATE THAT SHOULD BE WITHIN 60 DAYS, AND BETWEEN 3 0
AND 60 DAYS, OUR OFFICE WILL PREPARE THE WARRANT FOR YOUR
SIGNATURE.
THE COURT:

DOES THE DEFENSE HAVE ANY DATE

THAT IS MORE PREFERABLE THAN THE OTHER?
MS. WELLS:
DECISION, YOUR HONOR.

I THINK THAT IS THE COURT'S

THE COURT IS AWARE THAT DATE WOULD

BE VACATED DUE TO AN APPEAL, SO I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO
DO THAT WITHIN YOUR PREROGATIVE.
THE COURT:

THIRTY DAYS.

MR. JONES:

IT HAS TO BE A MINIMUM OF 3 0
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